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MAKING UCITA MORE
CONSUMER-FRIENDLY
by

MICHAEL L. RUSTADt

Butch: Is that what you call giving cover?
Sundance: Is that what you call running? If I knew you were going to
stroll...
1
Butch: Good. For a moment there, I thought we were in trouble.
Butch Cassidy & the Sundance Kid

I.

INTRODUCTION

The approval of the Uniform Computer Information Transactions
Act ("UCITA") in July, 1999, by the National Conference on Uniform
State Laws ("NCCUSL") is the culmination of a ten-year war between
the software industry, consumer representatives, the entertainment industry and other stakeholders over the fundamental rules for electronic
contracts, software licensing, and Internet contracts. In the early 1990s,
NCCUSL and the American Law Institute ("ALI") agreed to update the
Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") to include software-licensing agreements. Initially, UCITA was proposed as Article 2B, a new article of the
UCC. The new article would include software licenses in the UCC for the
t Professor of Law and Director of the High Technology Law Program, Suffolk University Law School; LL.M., 1986, Harvard University; J.D., 1984, Suffolk University Law
School; Ph.D., 1981, Boston College. Professor Rustad teaches courses in commercial law,
Internet law, and high technology law. Mr. Rustad has been a participant observer in the
drafting of U.C.I.T.A. as a member of the American Law Institute ("ALI") and is a Task
Leader of the American Bar Association ("ABA") Business Law Section's Subcommittee on
Licensing Technology. He was formerly co-chair of the Task Force on the General Provisions of the Proposed UCC Article 2B. Mr. Rustad would like to thank Adele Barnaby,
Bobby Hazelton, Shennan Kavanagh, Chryss Knowles, Jonathan Nielsen, Tracy Savy, and
Peter Stecher for their assistance in preparing this article for publication. He would also
like to thank Marie Clear, Class of 2002, John Marshall Law School, who skillfully edited
and cite-checked this piece. Mr. Rustad would also like to thank Bradley Ullrick, Class of
2001, also of the John Marshall Law School, for organizing the symposium issue. Finally,
he would like to thank Professor Ann Lousin of the John Marshall Law School for her
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1. Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid (visited Oct. 4, 1999) <http'/lwebclass.ncu.
edu.tw/12024/notes/buteh.html>.
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first time. The inclusion of software and online contracts was part of a
general remodeling of the UCC that began in the late 1980s.2
The ALI's withdrawal of its support for Article 2B led the NCCUSL
to propose UCITA as a stand-alone statute. 3 UCITA applies to "computer
transactions," 4 which is broadly construed to cover "contracts to create,
modify, transfer or license computer information or informational rights
in computer information." 5 UCITA pertains to wide variety of Internetrelated mass-market licenses 6 including contracts to download
software, 7 access contracts, 8 click-wrap agreements, 9 Web-wrap agree2. See generally Amelia H. Boss, Developments on the Fringe: Article 2 Revisions,
Computer Contracting and Suretyship, 46 Bus. LAw. 1803 (1991); Jeffrey B. Ritter,
Software Transactions and Uniformity: Accommodating Codes Under the Code, 46 Bus.
LAw. 1825 (1991).
3. See Thorn Weidlich, Commission Plans New UCC Article, NAT'L L. J. (Aug. 28,
1995), at B1 (noting that NCCUSL appointed Houston law professor Raymond T. Nimmer
as Technology Reporter for the new UCC Article 2B); See also Raymond T. Nimmer, Intangibles Contracts: Thoughts of Hubs, Spokes and ReinvigoratingArticle 2, 35 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1337 (1994).
4. U.C.I.T.A. § 103(a) (NCCUSL Draft for Approval, July 1999) [hereinafter
U.C.I.T.A.].
5. U.C.I.T.A. § 102(a)(12).
6. U.C.I.T.A. § 102(a)(44). U.C.I.T.A. defines the mass-market license to mean "a
standard form that is prepared and used in a mass-market transaction." Id. A mass-market transaction, in turn, means:
(A) A consumer transaction; or (B) any other transaction with an end-user licensee
if: (i) the transaction is for information or informational rights directed to the general public as a whole including consumers, under substantially the same terms
for the same information; (ii) the licensee acquires the information or rights in a
retail transaction under terms and in quantity consistent with an ordinary transaction in a retail market.
Id. § 102(a)(46).
7. See, e.g., Adobe Sys. Intl, CustomerFirstSupport LicenseAgreement (visited Feb. 1,
1999) <http'j/www.adobe.com/supportservice/custsupport/Library>. Adobe Systems, Inc.,
for example, conditions the downloading of software from its Web site on agreement with
terms and conditions. Id. The license agreement advises the Web site visitor that they
must agree to the terms and conditions of its end user license agreement as a condition for
downloading software. Id. The Adobe license agreement states:
By downloading software of Adobe Systems Incorporated or its subsidiaries
("Adobe") from the site, you agree to the following terms and conditions. If you do
not agree with such terms and conditions do not download the software. The
terms of an end user license agreement accompanying a particular software file
upon installation or download of the software shall supercede the terms presented
below.
Id.
8. See U.C.I.T.A. § 102(a)(1). An access contract "means a contract to obtain electronically access to, or information from, an information processing system of another person,
or the equivalent of such access." Id. U.C.I.T.A. will therefore cover access contracts such
as Westlaw, LEXIS, Microsoft Network, America Online, and the on-line version of the
Wall Street Journal,which is subscription-based.
9. See, e.g., Phillips Fox, On-Line Transactionsand Click-Wrap Agreements (June,
1999) <http'//www.phillipsnizer.com/artnew27.htm>. Many companies use "click-wrap
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validates
ments, 10 and electronic data interchange.' 1 UCITA also
12
shrink-wrap agreements that accompany boxed software.
The statutory purposes of UCITA are to facilitate computer or information transactions in cyberspace; clarify the law governing computer
information transactions; enable expanding commercial practice in computer information transactions by commercial usage and agreement of
13
the parties; and make the law relating to these transactions uniform.
UCITA provides key infrastructure to e-commerce not found in any state
or federal statute. For example, UCITA defines and validates the use of
electronic agents 14 to form online contracts. UCITA provides legal rules
agreements" where a subscriber signifies acceptance or rejection by clicking the mouse on a
highlighted "I accept" or "I decline" icon. Id. Netscape's Navigator is distributed with an
end user "click-wrap" or "click-stream" license. See Netscape Communications Corp., Netscape Client Software End User License Agreement <http:/home.netscape.com/download/
client.html>. The typical click-wrap agreement will state: By clicking the 'accept' button,
you are consenting to be bound by and are becoming a party to this agreement. If you do
not agree to all of the terms of this agreement, click the 'do not accept' button and the
installation process will not continue. Id. (illustrating similar agreement language).
10. See, e.g., Real Networks, Legal Notice, Disclaimer,and Terms of Use (visited Feb.
9, 1999) <http'//www.real.com/company/legal.html>. A Web-wrap or click-stream contract
is typically structured as a license agreement. Web site visitors are given a license to use
material on a given Web site. The license, for example, may restrict the visitor from distributing, copying, or preparing derivative works from a company's Web site materials.
The license spells out permitted and restricted uses by visitors, and access to and use of the
Web site is provided subject to the license agreement's terms and conditions. Real Networks for example, conditions use of information, artwork, text, video, audio or pictures on
the visitor's acceptance of its terms of service. Id.
11. See Robert W. McKeon, Jr., Electronic Data Interchange:Uses and Legal Aspects in
the CommercialArena, 12 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 511, 512-514 (1994). In a
typical Electronic Data Interchange ("EDI") agreement, the parties enter-into a trader
party agreement with subsequent transactions handled automatically by electronic agents.
Id. EDI transactions are business-to-business online contracts. Id. Under the common law
there must be a formal offer by one party and acceptance by the other. Id. EDI is a contracting practice by which the parties set guidelines for what qualifies as an offer and acceptance. Id. It is a means for businesses to communicate electronically computer-tocomputer, and it eliminates the need for maintaining paper record systems and multiple
data entries. Id. The major legal questions to EDI contracts are the validity and enforceability of computer contracts. See Jeffrey B. Ritter, Scope of the Uniform Commercial Code:
Computer Contracting Cases and Electronic Commercial Practices, 45 Bus. LAW. 2533,
2555 (1990).
12. Software is often packaged with shrink-wrap plastic covering the package. The
shrink-wrap license receives its name from the practice of software vendors of printing
shrink-wrap licenses beneath the shrink-wrap or in the box containing software. While
some shrink-wrap license agreements are printed on the outside of the box, others cannot
be seen until the software is paid for and the box opened. Still other software vendors
display the shrink-wrap license agreement only after the software is booted up and the
terms are displayed on the user's screen.
13. See U.C.I.T.A-, Prefatory Note.
14. See U.C.I.T.A. § 102(a)(27).
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for electronic events such as the "electronic authentication, display,
message, record or performance" that are critical to Internet
15
transactions.
Article 2B and UCITA, its successor statute, are the most controversial codification projects in recent history. Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid was a 1969 film that featured Paul Newman and Robert
Redford playing two famous outlaws of the American Wild West.' 6
Butch and Sundance were pursued by a relentless posse after repeatedly
robbing the Union Pacific railroad. 1 7 The outlaws used every technique
to evade the posse but the lawmen just kept coming.' 8 Butch finally
turned to Sundance and asked: "Who are those guys?" 19 The battles over
the enactment of UCITA and former UCC Article 2B resemble the last
days of Butch and Sundance when the posse just kept pursuing the outlaws. UCITA is in danger of being killed off by interest groups that vow
to oppose the model statute when it is introduced into state legislatures.
If UCITA is not enacted, courts will be left with no alternative but to
stretch UCC Article 2 to Internet and software licenses.
In Part II of this article, I make the case that state legislatures
should adopt UCITA rather than capitulate to the anti-UCITA posse.
UCITA will "simplify, clarify and modernize" the commercial law and is
a vast improvement over applying Article 2 to computer information contracts. 20 UCITA brings certainty to information-based license agreements in a way that brings common sense to the common law.
In Part III, I recommend two modest amendments to UCITA, which
could serve to clarify UCITA's benefit to consumers. UCITA would be
even more forward-looking if software vendors were held to a minimum
standard that required their software to substantially conform to its documentation. The inclusion of this mandatory term would bring greater
balance to consumer transactions which are entirely adhesive. Consumers would be entitled to a full refund plus reasonable incidental damages
under a mandatory minimum remedy. The software industry generally
advocates a law of licensing that permits the vendor to contractually
limit the end-user's remedies to repair, replacement or refund. Under
my proposal, vendors could not disclaim the implied warranty of
merchantability. If software did not substantially conform to its docu15. U.C.I.T.A. § 102(a)(29).
16. See Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid (Twentieth Century Fox/Campanile
1969).
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. Id.
20. U.C.C. § 1-102 (1999). U.C.I.T.A. shares these common purposes with the UCC.
Like the UCC, U.C.I.T.A. will permit the continued expansion of commercial practices such
as Internet contracts, e-commerce, and online contracting. Id.
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mentation, the consumer would be guaranteed a refund and reimbursement of reasonable incidental damages.
UCITA already recognizes the necessity of a minimum adequate
remedy. Section 803 states that "if performance of an exclusive or limited remedy causes the remedy to fail of its essential purpose, the aggrieved party may pursue other remedies." 2 1 The policy underlying the
doctrine of "failure of essential purpose" is "that at least minimum ade22
quate remedies be available."
Consumer licensees who enter into mass-market transactions
should be guaranteed a minimum adequate remedy of a right to a refund
plus incidental damages when the software substantially fails to conform
to its documentation. 23 The present "minimum adequate remedy" of
§ 803 represents the default warranties and remedies of UCITA. 24 However, § 803 only applies where the parties specify that a limited remedy
is the exclusive or sole remedy. 25 Software licensors frequently disclaim
all warranties and consequential damages, without specifying an exclusive or limited remedy. Whether a limited remedy is exclusive or not, the
concept of a minimum adequate remedy should be extended to all massmarket licenses.
My second suggested amendment would be that UCITA explicitly
declare it is governed by state deceptive trade practice acts. Mass-market licenses are retail transactions that should be treated as the functional equivalent of a sale. There is some uncertainty as to whether
federal or state consumer protection statutes applying to durable goods
also apply to information licenses. Section 105 states that UCITA gives
way to consumer protection statutes. 26 The proposed amendment would
make it clear that UCITA will not supplant state or federal consumer
protection. Section 105 should be amended to explicitly state that
UCITA extends federal and state consumer protection statutes to massmarket computer software and other licenses. 27 This amendment is only
necessary because of the uncertainty whether courts will extend state
and federal consumer protection laws developed for durable goods to in21. U.C.I.T.A. § 803.
22. U.C.C. § 2-719, O.C. 1.
23. A consumer transaction is one where the software or other information is used or
bought primarily for personal, family or household purposes. U.C.I.T.A. § 102(a)(16). The
amendment proposed here adapts UCC § 9-109(1) to U.C.I.T.A. mass-market transactions.
See U.C.C. § 109(2).
24. U.C.I.T.A. § 803.
25. See id.
26. See U.C.I.T.A. § 105(c). The section states "[except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), if this [Act) conflicts with a consumer protection statute [or administrative
rule], the conflicting statute [or rule] governs." Id.
27. See U.C.I.T.A. § 105(c).
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28
tangibles such as software or access contracts.
As in the final scene of Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid, the
guns are blazing and UCITA is trapped on a ledge in big trouble. In the
nine months after NCCUSL approved the model statute, only Virginia
and Maryland have enacted UCITA.2 9 Iowa has adopted a poison pill
statute "which declares voidable a choice of law clause if the state law
selected was UCITA."30 UCITA has been introduced in Delaware, the
District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, and Oklahoma. 3 1 UCITA has not
even been introduced in any of the other states, making it quite clear
that the model statute is unlikely to be adopted nationwide any time
soon. UCITA will not be widely enacted without the support of consumer
groups in the state legislatures, and consumer groups are united in their
opposition to UCITA. Chief Justice John Marshall, in addressing the
Supreme Court, stated that there were times when a question has been
discussed, "until discussion has been useless. It has been argued, until
argument is exhausted." 32 UCITA will not be widely adopted by the state
legislatures unless the key stakeholders are willing to meet on Marshall's ground of compromise.

II.

THE CASE FOR ADOPTING UCITA

Modification implies growth. It is the life of the law.
33
Louis Brandeis

A. THE

POLITICS OF

UCITA

UCITA has been controversial from the start when it was conceived
as Article 2B of the UCC. It has been difficult to engineer a consensus
about the rules for information transfers because few interest groups
came to the bargaining table with a spirit of compromise. The innumerable drafts of Article 2B, which preceded UCITA, were hotly debated by
industry, consumer and bar association groups. In March of 1995, NCCUSL approved a "hub and spoke" model 34 that treated Article 2B as a
28. The Magnuson-Moss Act, for example, applies to consumer goods used for personal
or household purposes. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301 (1997). It is uncertain, though, whether the
Magnuson-Moss Act will be extended to the licensing of software to consumers.
29. U.C.I.T.A. Online, What's Happening to UCITA in the States (visited May 3, 2000)
<http'/www.U.C.I.T.A.online.com/whathap.com>.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 505 (1919) (quoting John Marshall), reprinted in EUGENE C. GERHART, QUOTE IT COMPLETELY! 177 (1998).
33. Washington v. Dawson Co., 264 U.S. 219, 236 (1924).
34. See U.C.C. Revised Article 2 (Proposed "Hub and Spoke" Draft, Feb. 10, 1995)
[hereinafter Hub and Spoke Draft]. Hub provisions included general standards such as
good faith or reasonableness as well as specific rules that were shared by each spoke: Arti-
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separate spoke sharing hub provisions with Articles 2 and 2A. The hub
and spoke model sought to harmonize Articles 2, 2A and 2B by forging
general principles common to each article. It envisioned a common hub
and separate spokes for Articles 2, 2A and 2B that correspond to sales,
35
leases and licenses respectively.
A wide variety of stakeholders such as The Software Publishers Association ("SPA") opposed the hub and spoke model. 3 6 The SPA claimed
that, "[e]xcept for [two people], no one on the 16-member drafting committee working on Article 2 of the UCC seems to have any experience in
licensing, high-technology matters and intellectual property."3 7 The SPA
was critical of the model for being too anti-industry and too pro-consumer. 38 A corporate counsel for a Fortune 500 company complained
that the drafting committee included too many law professors with a proconsumer bias. 39 Other critics argued just the opposite, that Article 2B
40
was a statute by and for the software industry against consumers.
Consumer representatives argued that Article 2B was anti-consumer
and that they were not included in the drafting process.4 1 Ralph Nader's
Consumer Project on Technology also calls for the defeat of UCITA because of its pro-industry bias. 42 The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC")
questions whether it is appropriate for UCITA to depart from well-established "consumer protection and competition policy principles in a state
commercial law statute."43 The FTC believes that UCITA needs to be
modified to protect consumers.
The death knell for the hub and spoke model sounded in late July,
1995, when NCCUSL abandoned the entire hub and spoke architecture
in favor of making Article 2B a separate UCC article. 4 4 NCCUSL eliminated the hub and spoke but retained Raymond Nimmer as the Article
cles 2, 2A and 2B. Id. The idea was that common provisions to the Articles would be found
in the hub, whereas provisions unique to sales, leases and licenses, would be in specialized
spokes. Id.
35. See id.
36. See Jonathan Groner, This Uniform Code Does Not Compute: Software Industry
Balks at Rewrite of Commercial Law, LEGAL TImEs, Nov. 1, 1993, at 1.
37. Id.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See generally Cem Kanner, UCC Article 2B: A New Law of Software Quality (visited Oct. 12, 1999) <httpJ/www.badsoftware.com/uccsqa.htm>.
41. See id. (summarizing consumer objections to the drafting of U.C.I.T.A-).
42. See id.
43. See Letter from the Federal Trade Commission ("FrC") to John L. McClaugherty,
Chief, Executive Committee, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law
(July 9, 1999), available at <http'J/www.ftc.gov/be/v990010.htm>.
44. See Weidlich supra note 3.
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2B reporter. 4 5 In addition to Professor Nimmer, the key players for the
Article 2B project were the American Bar Association, 46 NCCUSL and
the ALI.4 7 Both the ALI and the NCCUSL needed to approve a completed draft before it could be introduced in the state legislatures. 48
In May, 1999, the ALI withdrew sponsorship of Article 2B as a separate article of the UCC, and the NCCUSL approved the new Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act two months later. 49 Unlike Article 2B, UCITA will not be proposed as a UCC article but will be introduced to state legislatures as a stand-alone statute. 50 The final
approved version of UCITA reflects compromises with various consumer
and industry stakeholders. The problem for the reporter and the UCITA
Drafting Committee was that by the time a compromise was reached
with one aggrieved stakeholder, another interest group stepped forward
arguing that they were unrepresented in the drafting process. Wave after wave of UCITA critics have come forward in the ten-year war over its
enactment. Like Butch Cassidy, the UCITA's Reporter must be asking
himself: "Who are these guys?"
B.

THE IDEOLOGY OF

UCITA

Karl Mannheim's sociology of knowledge provides some insight into
the sources of opposition to UCITA. 5 l Mannheim, like the legal realists,
argued that all ideas were socially constructed and situated. 5 2 To Mannheim, ideas were shaped by ideologies. Under his sociology of knowledge, commercial law would be viewed as a set of beliefs that explain and
justify social arrangements. He viewed ideology as a justification of the
status quo or "things as they are."53 Professor A.P. Simonds describes
54
Mannheim's theory of ideology and utopia as fundamentally opposed.
45. See Carol A. Kunze, The 2Bguide:Background (visited Apr. 25, 1999) <http'//www.
2bguide.com/bkgd.html#I>.
46. I participated in the Article 2B drafting process through the American Bar Association as a task force leader for the Scope ofArticle 2B for the ABA Subcommittee on Software
Licensing (later to be named Information Licensing) of the Business Law Section co-chaired
by Donald Cohn and Mary Jo Dively.
47. See Kunze, supra note 45.
48. See id.
49. See Joint Press Release from N.C.C.U.S.L. and A.L.I., NCCUSL to Promulgate
Freestanding Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act-ALI and NCCUSL Announce that Legal Rules for Computer Information Will Not Be Partof UCC (Apr. 7, 1999),
available at <http'J/www.2bguide.com/docs/040799pr.html>. See also U.C.I.T.A.
50. Id.
51. See generally KARL MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA (Louis Wirth & Edward

Shils, trans., 1936).
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See A.P. SimoNDs, KARL MANNHEIMS SOCIOLOGy OF KNOWLEDGE 99 (1978).
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An ideology is a set of beliefs that reflects the interest of dominant
groups to explain and justify their own economic interests.5 5 In contrast,
56
utopia is critical of the status quo and tends to be forward looking.
Professor Simonds notes that Mannheim distinguishes "between the
terms 'ideology' and 'utopia' in order to emphasize the significance of this
57
difference."
Although there are many differences among and between stakeholders, there are basically two camps representing ideological and utopian
perspectives. The supporters of UCITA favor a regime of private ordering, whereas its opponents favor social welfaristic or regulatory approach
to software licenses. 58 UCITA is ideological in favoring a private market
approach over a regulatory approach. 5 9 The co-chairs of the ABA
Software Licensing Committee acknowledge that the task for UCITA
60
drafters is to create "gap fillers" that conform to industry practices.
They contend that the drafting "process is not intended to rewrite the
law for commercial parties, the fundamental tenets of [freedom of con"
tract that] have been in place since the creation of the UCC. 61
The ideology of private ordering views autonomous choices as the
"legitimate exercise of the right of self-government or self-determination."6 2 UCITA advocates oppose mandatory non-waivable provisions as
reallocating the risk "between the contracting parties in ways that are
contrary to current industry practice in many cases."6 3 UCITA's
software industry supporters seek to codify industry practices, such as
shrink-wrap or click-wrap licenses. Many of the opponents of UCITA
55. See generally MANNHEIM, supra note 51.
56. See id.
57. See SIMONDS, supra note 54.
58. U.C.I.T.A. is premised on the private ordering of software licensing. U.C.I.T.A.'s
reporter and the drafting committee have a belief in the efficacy of the free market and in
the right to private property.
59. See generally John Locke, SECOND TREATISE ON GovERNMENT (1690). The "free
market" ideology may be traced back John Locke. Locke defended the rights of the emerging mercantilist middle class to own property and conduct business with a minimum of
government interference. Id. The Clinton Administration favors a free market approach to
the Internet and e-commerce. See generally THE WHITE HOUSE, A FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (July 1, 1997). The White House endorsed a minimalist role for the
government and that the "governments should refrain from imposing new and unnecessary
regulations, bureaucratic procedures, or taxes and tariffs on commercial activities that
take place via the Internet." Id.
60. Mary Jo Howard Dively & Donald A. Cohn, The Treatment of Consumers Under
Proposed UCC Article 2B Licenses, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 315, 317
(1997).
61. Id.
62. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMrrs OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 8 (1993).
63. Dively & Cohn, supra note 60, at 317.
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favor a pro-regulatory approach under which terms and conditions for
software licenses are strictly policed.
Pro-regulatory opponents of UCITA, such as the Consumer Project
on Technology and others, regularly attended Article 2B and UCITA
meetings.6 4 They point out that mass-market licenses are adhesive contracts that offer no possibility of negotiation. The freedom of contract is a
legal fiction in "take it or leave it" mass-market licenses. Free market
individualism is premised on the assumption that human beings are motivated primarily by economic self-interest and have a right to pursue
self-interest "without interference from others or the imposition of alternative conceptions of the good by others."6 5 It is in the self-interest of
the software industry to disclaim all warranties and consequential damages, which may leave consumers without a minimum adequate remedy.
At the federal level, the Clinton Administration endorses a minimalist role for government regulation of the Internet. The Clinton White
House Report on Global Electronic Commerce argues that the government "should be able to support and enforce a predictable, minimalist,
consistent and simple legal environment for commerce." 6 6 The White
House supports the efforts of "participants in the marketplace [as defining] most of the rules that will govern electronic commerce," thus endorsing Article 2B's attempt to apply the UCC to cyberspace. 67 The ideology
of UCITA advocates is decidedly in the camp of supporting industry practices "as they are" with minimal government interference. 68
UCITA adopts the jurisprudence of the UCC that courts should enforce private ordering arrangements. Karl Llewellyn, reporter for UCC
Article 2, wrote, "If a statute is to make sense, it must be read in the
light of some assumed purpose. A statute merely declaring a rule, with
no purpose or objective, is nonsense."6 9 UCITA did not descend from the
legal heavens in the form of stone tablets.7 0 The drafting of Article 2 was
a response to "the apparent rigidity and incompatibility [of pre-Code law]
64. Id. at 319.
65. TREBILCOCK, supra note 62, at 9.
66. See WHrrE HOUSE, supra note 59.
67. Id. The paper argues:
Parties should be able to do business with each other on the Internet under
whatever terms and conditions they agree upon ...To encourage electronic commerce, the U.S. government should support the development of both a domestic
and global uniform commercial legal framework that recognizes, facilitates and
enforces electronic transactions worldwide.

Id.
68. See generally, Dively & Cohen supra note 60.
69. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 374 (1960).

70. See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35
COLUM. L. REv. 809 (1935) (coining the term "legal heavens").
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with commercial norms." 7 1
UCITA follows Article 2's methodology in drawing distinctions between rules for merchants and non-merchants. 7 2 Much of Article 2 can
be characterized as default rules created by and for the business community. The parties may elect to opt in or opt out of UCITA, but they cannot alter mandatory consumer protection rules. The UCC, as a whole, is
73
designed to permit the "continued expansion of commercial practices."
UCITA follows the UCC in the law-merchant tradition of incorporating
business customs and trade usages into commercial law. 74 Section 211
provides that the terms of the contract include the express agreement,
"course of dealing, usage of trade, and the nature of the parties'
75
conduct."
Revised UCC Articles 3 and 4, for example, validated expanding
commercial practices such as the electronic presentment of negotiable
71. Allen R. Kamp, Between-the-Wars Social Thoughts: Karl Llewellyn, Legal Realism
and the UCC in Context, 59 ALB. L. REV. 325, 332 (1995).
72. Special merchant rules include: § 2-201(2), the Statute of Frauds; § 2-205, the
merchants' only "firm offer" rule; § 2-207, the merchants' confirmatory memoranda rule for
"battle of the forms;" § 2-209, the merchants' sales contract modification rule; § 2-312,
merchant rule for warranty against infringement; § 2-314, implied warranty of
merchantability; § 2-316(2), special merchant rule for disclaiming warranties; § 2103(1)(b), special merchant rule for good faith; § 2-327(1)(c), merchants' rule for following
reasonable instructions in "Sale on Approval" or "Sale or Return" contracts; § 2-603, special
duties for merchant buyers in dealing with rejected goods; § 2-605, merchants' special rule
for waiver of buyer's objection by failure to particularize defects; § 2-509(3), special
merchants' rule for risk of loss in the absence of breach; § 2-402(2), merchants' rule for
rights of seller's creditors; § 2-403(2) merchants' entrusting rule and power to transfer
goods to a buyer in the ordinary course of business; and § 2-609, merchants' right to adequate assurance of performance. U.C.I.T.A. essentially adapts Article 2's methodology of
having separate rules for merchants and non-merchants in computer transactions.
U.C.I.T.A. defines the "merchant" as a person that deals in information or informational
rights of the kind or that otherwise by the person's occupation holds itself out has having
knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or information involved in the transaction or a
person to which such knowledge or skill may be attributed by the person's employment of
an agent or broker or other intermediary that by its occupation holds itself out as having
such knowledge or skill. U.C.I.T.A. § 102 (47). As with Article 2, U.C.I.T.A. has a special
Statute of Frauds rule for merchants. U.C.I.T.A. § 201(d) (stating that where both parties
are merchants there is an exception to the writing requirement where notice of objection "is
not given within 10 days after a confirming record is received."). There is a special
merchants' rule for U.C.I.T.A. § 204, which is the functional equivalent of§ 2-207's battle of
the forms. See U.C.I.T.A. § 204(d)(2) (stating that "between merchants, the proposed additional terms become part of the contract unless the offeror gives notice of objection before or
within a reasonable time after it receives the proposed terms."). As with Article 2,
U.C.I.T.A. has a large number of special merchant rules.
73. U.C.C. § 102(2)(b).
74. See Mirabile v. Uda Udoh, 399 N.Y.S.2d 869 (1977) (stating that "the principles of
the law merchant supplement the UCC through § 1-103"). See also U.C.C. § 1-103 (incorporating the law merchant into UCC jurisprudence).
75. U.C.C., § 211(a).
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instruments. 76 The revisions to these Articles helped to bring certainty
to the law by validating banking practices in sending and presenting
items to payor banks. 7 7 The UCC is a semi-permanent piece of legislation that is continually updated. Articles 3 and 4 were revised to update
the law in a way that was favorable to the banking community. 78 It is
well documented how the original draft of Article 3 and 4 was completed
by and for the banking community. 79 Edward Rubin, a former ABA Subcommittee Chair for Articles 3 and 4, explains why the revised Articles
have rules that unduly favor the banking community.8 0 His brief history
of the revision of Articles 3 and 4 provides a convincing account of how
special interests captured the revision process. 8 ' Professor Rubin went
on to explain that he resigned from the ABA committee because the industry representatives that captured Articles 3 and 4 "thought like lawyers and acted as lobbyists."8 2 He recounted how bank lawyers on the
ABA committee he chaired claimed neutrality, yet their positions revealed the economic and social interests of their clients.
One attorney assured Professor Rubin of his value-neutrality:
"When I participate in an advisory committee, I check my clients at the
door."8 3 However, Rubin observed how each of the supposedly neutral
attorneys "brought their conceptual frameworks in the room with
them."8 4 Similar disclaimers are made by the leadership of other law

reform organizations such as the American Law Institute whose President begins each annual meeting by asking members to "check their cli76. U.C.C. § 4-110.
77. U.C.C. § 4-204.
78. See U.C.C. § 3-605(c). The rules on the discharge of indorsers and accommodation
parties are an obvious example of rules tilted in favor of the banking industry. Under the
old Code, an accommodation party was discharged if a bank extended the due date of an
obligation without permission of that party. However, under the revision an indorser or
accommodation is not automatically discharged by extensions. Id. The burden is placed on
the indorser or accommodation party to prove "that the extension caused loss to the indorser or accommodation party with respect to the right of recourse." Id. Similarly, under

the old Code a material modification of an obligation would have the effect of discharging
an accommodation party or surety. Id. Under the revised code, the indorser or accommodation party has the burden of proving loss. See id.
79. See GENERAL COMMENT OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAws AND THE AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE (1962); SELECTED COMMERCIAL STATUTES
21-22 (West 1996 ed.). The members of the Subcommittees considering Articles 3 and 4
were disproportionately Boston and New York bankers and representatives from the Federal Reserve Bank. Id. See also Walter Malcolm, The UCC in the United States, 12 INT'L &
CoMP. L. Q. 226, 229 (1963).

80. See Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like A Lawyer, Acting Like a Lobbyist: Some Notes
on the Process of Revising UCC Articles 3 and 4, 26 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 743, 749 (1993).

81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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ents at the door."8 5
The assumption that lawyers can divorce their ideas from the economic interests of their clients is a positivist one.8 6 German sociologist
Max Weber thought that legal sociologists had to be value-free and conduct research without bias strictly according to the norms of scientific
research-objectivity, verifiability and value-neutrality. Weber believed
that "social scientists should test their hypotheses and leave politics to
others." 8 7 UCITA follows the UCC in permitting the expansion of commercial transactions in information. UCITA adopts the "principles of
law and equity, including the law merchant."8 8 For many centuries, the
business community had its own fair courts where they made their own
law. The implied warranty of merchantability had its origin in these
merchant courts.8 9 The courts were an attractive alternative to "the
stiff-necked judges of the King's Bench who had been known to hold that
there was no such thing as a negotiable promissory note." 90 The
merchant fairs were an integral part of commercial law from the medieval period through the end of the eighteenth century. 9 1 The idea underlying the law merchant tradition was that the law should reflect business
practices. 9 2 Grant Gilmore, drafter of Article 9, argued that commercial
law should reflect business practices. 9 3 His advice to UCC codifiers was
to be "accurate not original."9 4 Codifying established business practices
into the commercial law is particularly difficult when trade usages are
still evolving. The World Wide Web is less than a decade old, and the
software industry has largely developed since the 1980s. UCITA, like
85. The President of the American Law Institute is Charles Alan Wright, a distinguished professor at the University of Texas.
86. See generally ALLAN G. JOHNSON, THE BLACKWELL DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY:- A
USER'S GUIDE TO SOCIOLOGICAL LANGUAGE (1995). Positivism was a social theory which
held that it was possible to objectively "observe social life and establish reliable, valid
knowledge about how it works." Id. at 207.
87. JOHN B. WILLIAMSON, LINDA EVANS, & MICHAEL RusTAD, SOCIAL PROBLEMS: THE
CONTEMPORARY DEBATES 3 (4th ed. 1985) (discussing Weber's sociological theory).

88. U.C.I.T.A. § 104.
89. See MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, THE CONCEPTS & METHODS OF SALES, LEASES AN)D
LICENSES 180 (1998) (noting that the doctrine of merchantability is traced back to the lawmerchant tradition).
90. Grant Gilmore, On the Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YALE L.J.
1341, 1342 (1948).
91. See RUSTAD, supra note 89, at 15.
92. Id. at 17. William Murray, Lord Mansfield, an eighteenth century English Chief
Justice, was the father of commercial law. Id. Lord Mansfield, Chief Justice of the King's
Bench between 1756 and 1788, authored opinions that key to the development of commercial law. Id. He made a regular practice of consulting with the business practice before
rendering commercial law opinions, and he went so far as to appoint merchant juries to
decide commercial disputes. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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the UCC, must be a semi-permanent piece of legislation amended to take
into account the continued expansion of the Internet.
The history of commercial law is a history of the business community working to transform commercial practices into a commercial law
that reflects their economic interests. 9 5 Oliver Wendell Holmes
prefigured the legal realists in arguing that "law was the supple tool of
power . . . and identified the task of fashioning legal policy as one of
96
cultural observation, not the mere invocation of rules."
C.

THE UTOPIA OF

UCITA's

OPPoNENTs

The regulatory camp within UCITA is skeptical that there is any
real freedom of contract with mass-market licensing. The pro-regulatory
97
forces include consumer advocates, software customers, librarians,
writers, photographers, the entertainment industry, magazines and
newspaper publishers. 98
The Consumer Project on Technology developed a UCITA protest
page on its Web site. 99 The Consumer Federation of America argued that
NCCUSL should table UCITA because of its "broad validation of shrinkwrap licenses ... and other imbalances in the draft [that] make it unacceptably biased against consumer interests." 10 0 The Free Software Project has mounted a campaign to defeat UCITA entirely. 1 1 Consumers
argue that UCITA makes it too easy to disclaim warranties and consequential damages. The list of legal organizations opposing UCITA is a
who's who of the profession: intellectual property law professors, law
professors specializing in contracts and commercial law, the Consumer's
Union, the American Intellectual Property Association, and the New
York City Bar Association.' 0 2 Fifty leading intellectual property law
95. See, e.g., ROBERT L. NoRDsTRoM, LAW OF SALEs 2 (1970). The Merchants Association of the City of New York, for example, sponsored a federal sales act in 1938. Id. The
members of the drafting committee and the participants from The American Law Institute
and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws were lawyers who
routinely represented business interests. Id.
96. OLIVER WENDELL HoLMEs, JR., THE COMMON LAw 1 (1881).

97. See generally American Association of Law Libraries (visited Oct. 11, 1999) <httpj/
www.arl.orglinfo/letters/libltr.html>.
98. See Cem Kaner, Flash:Meeting on UCITA/Article 2B (visited Oct. 11, 1999) <http'i
/www.badsofytware.com> (summarizing opposition to U.C.I.T.A.).
99. See Consumer Product on Technology, Article 2B Protest Page (visited Oct. 11,
1999) <http:www.cptech.org/ucc/sign-on.html>.
100. Steve Brobeck et al., Consumer Federation of America, Letter to Charles Alan
Wright, President, American Law Institute and Gene N. Lebrun, NCCUSL, Nov. 10, 1998.
101. See, e.g., Campaign Against Abusive Shrink-wrap Licenses (visited Oct. 18, 1999)
<httpj/commons.somewhere.com/rre/1999/RRE.campaign.against.abu.html>.
102. See Cem Kanner, UCITA-Opposition (visited Oct. 11, 1999) <http://www.bad
software.com/oppose.htm>.
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professors and forty three commercial law and contract professors signed
a letter opposing UCITA's predecessor, Article 2B.10 3 These law professors oppose UCITA because they perceive it as a special interest statute
that will upset the balance of federal intellectual property rights.1 0 4
Much of the motion picture industry, entertainment industry and important segments of the print media oppose UCITA. 10 5 Initially, the opposition was based on the industrys' concern that UCITA would apply to
06
movies, video, and satellite transmissions.1
UCITA's § 103 excludes the entertainment industry, but media
moguls continue their pledge to oppose the statute's enactment. The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers ("IEEE"), the Association
of Computing Machinery ("ACM") and the Society for Information Management ("SIM") likewise call for action to defeat UCITA.' 0 7 ACM argues
that the proposed statute will "deregulate product licensing... and allow
vendors to shut down software remotely if they suspect a violation of the
licensing terms."' 0 8 ACM also objects to UCITA on the grounds that it
would allow vendors to prohibit reverse engineering through contractual
use restrictions in license agreements.' 0 9 The National Writers Union
argues that the proposed statute is objectionable to writers. 1 10 Writers
and librarians oppose UCITA because of its perceived diminution of the
"fair use" doctrine of the Copyright Act."'
Many of UCITA's critics constitute a pro-regulatory camp favoring
built-in protections for consumers and other mass-market licensees.
103. See Letter from Prof. Mark A. Lemley et al. (intellectual property law professors) to
Carlyle C. Ring, Jr. Esq., Gene N. LeBrun & Professor Geoffrey Hazard, Jr. (Nov. 17, 1998),
available at <http://www.2Bguide.com/docs/1198ml.html>, and Letter from Mary Becker,
DePaul University of Law et al., to President Gene Lebrun and Other Commissioners, NCCUSL (July 16, 1999), available at <http://www.2bguide.com/docs/799profs.html>.
104. Id.
105. See Kanner, supra note 102 (noting that the representatives issued a letter to the
ALI and the NCCUSL which included signatories such as the Motion Picture Association of
America, Inc., the Recording Industry Association of America, Inc., the Newspaper Association of America, the National Association of Broadcasters, the National Cable Television
Association and the Magazine Publishers of America).
106. Id.
107. See Society for Information Management (SIM), Issues Advocacy-UCITA, ImmediateAction Requested on Uniform Computer Information TransactionsAct (FormerlyUCC
2B) (visited Oct. 11, 1999) <http'J/www.siniet.org/public/programs/issues/uccode.html>.
108. ACM Washington Update, U.S. Office of Public Policy of the Association for Computing Machinery, 3.1 ACM WASHINGTON UPDATE 1 (Aug. 3, 1999).
109. Id.
110. See National Writers Union, Warningsand Cautionsfor Writers-ElectronicIssues
(visited Oct. 11, 1999) <httpJ/www.sfwa.orgbewareelectronic.html>. The writers argue
that Article 2B, the predecessor to U.C.I.T.A. "reduces publishers' obligations to promote a
work... makes it easier for publishers to reject a work, endorsed 'all rights' contracts, and
invalidated writers transfer restrictions." Id.
111. Id.
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These pro-regulatory critics believe that there must "be a progressively
heavier regulatory approach towards transactions." 1 12 Liberal regulators generally support a software-licensing regime with mandatory
terms such as restrictions on the disclaimability of warranties and remedies. Regulators are legal realists who question whether there is freedom of contract in mass-market transactions. The adhesive nature of
shrink-wrap licenses is far from the ideal of the free market prevalent in
the nineteenth century. Regulators view freedom of contract, at least in
13
the context of mass-market license transactions, as a legal fiction.'
Article 2B, UCITA's predecessor, was also opposed by a diverse coalition of consumers, licensees, entertainment industry interests, and
other powerful stakeholders. Like UCITA, Article 2B was designed to be
comprehensive, providing the rules for the formation and performance of
computer-based information transfers. 1 14 The silver bullet that killed
Article 2B came when ALI Executive Committee top guns withdrew their
115
support.
The ALI's withdrawal from the Article 2B process precluded the possibility that software licensing and Internet commercial transactions
could be the subject of a specialized article of the UCC. Even though
UCITA will not be Article 2B of the UCC, its drafters were inspired by
the UCC. The UCC is the most influential and widely cited statute governing U.S. commercial transactions. UCITA adopts many of the concepts and methods of Article 2B, as well as the exact language of many
sections. Had the UCC included software licensing, it would have been a
quantum leap toward modernizing the UCC for the age of the Internet.
UCITA's liberal contract formation rules are inspired by Article 2 and
2B, as are its warranties and remedies."l 6 UCITA updates and extends
UCC principles to software licenses, computer transactions and the Internet. Unless the oppositional forces to UCITA are defused, the model
112. Roger Brownsword, The Philosophy of Welfarism and its Emergence in the Modern
WELFARISM IN CONTRACT LAW 25 (Roger Brownsword, et al. eds., 1994).
113. Jean Braucher, Proposed Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
(UCITA): Objectionsfrom the Consumer Perspective (visited May 4, 2000) <http/www.cpsr.
org/program/U.C.I.T.A./bracher.html> (arguing that U.C.I.T.A. validates fictional assent
and does not require that the terms "meet reasonable expectations.").
114. See U.C.C. § 2B-103, Reporter's Note 1 (Tentative Draft, Apr. 15, 1998) availableat
<httpi/www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ulc.htm>.
Article 2B deals primarily "with
software and multi-media contracts, access contracts, involving online and Internet transactions, and transactions involving licenses of data, text, and related information." Id.
115. See American Law Institute, A Message from CharlesAlan Wright, ALI President
(visited Oct. 11, 1999) <http'//www.ali.org/ali/caw.htm>. In the spirit of disclosure, I am a
member of the American Law Institute but not a member of the Executive Committee that
made the decision to withdraw its support for U.C.I.T.A.
116. RUSTAD, supra note 89, at 459-67.

English Law of Contract, Chapter 2 in
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statute will not be enacted in many jurisdictions, and a consistent approach to contracting information-based transactions will be elusive.
D.
1.

THE CASE FOR ADOPTING

UCITA

UCITA Adapts UCC Principlesto Cyberspace

Before the UCC emerged, legal realists such as Karl Llewellyn criticized the then dominant model of legal formalism, which focused too
much on elegant theories of contract formation and too little on commercial realities. 1 17 Llewellyn drafted liberal Article 2 contract formation
rules reflecting best business practices. 1 8 U.C.C. § 2-203 eliminates the
formality of contracts under seal. 119 Section 2-204 states that a sales
contract may be formed "in any manner sufficient to show agreement."120 As with UCC Article 2, UCITA contracts "may be formed in
any manner sufficient to show agreement." 12 1 It also permits contracts
to be formed by electronic agents in transactions that do not require
human review. 12 2 UCITA's flexible approach to online contracts will
permit the expansion of electronic commerce.
UCITA eschews the formalism of classical contract theory in favor of
the legal realism of Article 2. UCITA updates § 2-204 to include the possibility that licenses may be formed by the "operations of electronic
agents that recognize the existence of a contract." 123 It follows Article 2
in its rejection of classical contract roles such as the "meeting of the
minds," 124 the mirror image rule, and contracts under seal.
UCITA's purpose is to adapt the UCC to cyberspace. UCITA was
prefigured in a 1987 ABA Report by the "Ad Hoc Committee on the Scope
of the UCC" (ABA Report). 12 5 The ABA Report concluded that there was
a need for legislation that would provide "uniform, consistent rules that
fairly distribute risk and establish coherent frameworks" for computer
and software contracts.' 2 6 Software contracts involve "a complex blend
of service contract, intellectual property and product delivery ques117. See generally Imad D. Abyad, Commercial Reasonablenessin Karl Llewellyn's Uniform Commercial Code Jurisprudence,83 VA. L. REv. 429 (Mar. 1997).

118. Id. For adhesive contracts, the best business practices would be for the software
industry to acknowledge the need to incorporate consumer protection into transactions
where there is no possibility of negotiation.
119. U.C.C. § 2-203.
120. U.C.C. § 2-204.
121. U.C.I.T.A. § 202(a).
122. See U.C.I.T.A. § 102(a)(28).
123. U.C.I.T.A. § 202(a).
124. See U.C.C. § 2-204(2). This section states that the "precise moment of [a sales contract's] making [may be] undermined." Id.
125. See Raymond T. Nimmer, Software Licensing Contracts: Proposal for Study by the
A.B.A. Ad Hock Committee on the Scope of the UCC 1 (1987) [hereinafter ABA Proposal].
126. Id. at 2.
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tions." 127 The ABA recognized that Article 2 did not adequately accommodate computer contracts because these transactions were a hybrid of
sales and service.
Beginning in the late 1980s, the entire UCC began to be overhauled.
Article 2 governing sales was born four decades before the advent of the
software industry. The law of sales is based upon the idea of passing
title to goods for a price, and Article 2 focuses on the sale of durable
goods. The classic definition of a license is "a mere waiver of the right to
sue" for infringement. 12s In contrast, software licensors retain title in
order to "restrict the customer's resale rights, prohibit disassembly of the
software, and limit warranty obligations and other liabilities." 129 Information licensing is different than the sale of goods because title does not
pass. Licenses impose use restrictions which are unknown with the sale
of goods.
A contract for the sale of goods is one in which a seller agrees to
transfer goods that conform to the contract in exchange for valuable consideration.130 Rather than being sold for commercial transfers of information, software is typically licensed. 1 31 The licensing of downloadable
software shares little common ground with the traditional attributes of a
sale of goods. With the sale of goods, title passes when the buyer accepts
and pays in accordance with the contract, and it is marked by physical
delivery of tangible goods. No title passes with the licensing of software.
Location and use restrictions are necessary for software developers to
realize their investment in developing intangible information assets.
A licensee is typically not permitted to resell licensed software.
Software, unlike goods, may be delivered computer-to-computer without
human intervention. The licensor retains title to software or other information and imposes restriction on use. No mass-market software developer could stay in business if all rights were transferred to the software
with the first sale. 132 Licensing is a useful and necessary legal invention
127. Id.
128. General Talking Pictures, Inc. v. Western Electric Co., 304 U.S. 175, 181 (1938)
(defining the patent license as "a mere waiver of the right to sue.").
129. Andrew R. Basile, Jr., Licensing Rights in Information Owned by Others, ONLINE
LAw: THE SPAs LEGAL GUIDE TO DOING BusINEss ON THE INTERNET 285 (Thomas

Smedinghoff ed., 1996).
130. See U.C.C. § 2-301 (Drai 1999).
131. Software contracts, access contacts, multi-media contracts and a host of online contracts are structured as licenses rather than sales to avoid the "first sale" doctrine of Copyright Law. A license is permission to use software, databases, intellectual property or other
information. Additionally, it may be based on number of copies licensed, the method of
distribution, the type of end user, or the form of a license agreement.
132. The software industry has developed licensing as a means of bypassing first sale.
Licensing is a useful legal invention, which permits the industry to realize value. A "sale"
is defined by the "passing of title from a seller to a buyer for a price." U.C.C. § 2-106(1).
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to permit software developers to realize their investment.
The drafters conceived of the UCC as a statute that would continually be updated to reflect social and technological change. Article 2 was
authored fifty years ago, decades before the development of the software
industry and the Internet. Cultural lag is a term that describes what
happens in a legal system when the law regulating social institutions
does not keep pace with technological changes. 13 3 The UCC and the
software industry have both suffered from legal as well as cultural lag.
The software licensing industry has been evolving since the mid-1980s.
IBM held a press conference in August of 1981 to introduce a new concept, the IBM Personal Computer or the PC.' 3 4 Eleven years later, the
software industry had revenues that equaled the sale of hardware. 13 5
Since then, software and services expanded at a rate many times that of
hardware. 13 6 The sale of goods, however, differs substantially from the
licensing of information, and the commercial law for licensing information lags far behind social and technological developments. UCITA seeks
to provide a legal infrastructure for the "fastest growing part of the
United States economy ... transactions that shape computer-information industries." 137 Software does not require a large inventory but "involves little or no raw-material cost and little or no inventory cost. It's

13
just l's and 0's." 8

Without UCITA, courts have no practical alternative but to stretch
sales law to include the law of licensing. However, the courts' attempt to
apply a fifty year old law of sales to the licensing of intangibles is like
applying horse and buggy laws in the industrial age. "Software licenses
are difficult to categorize as goods because they possess elements of both
Licensing is a lower-order transfer of a property interest, parsing a right to use software or
digital information and other intangibles for a designated period of time or under designated conditions. The licensing of intangibles, like leases, validates the legal concept of the
right to use property. The title to tangible copies of intangibles is not dispositive or even
relevant to licensing rights. With software licensing, the medium is not the message, only
the right to exploit information. The ease of copying software has made the invention of
licensing the only efficient method of realizing value.
133. See generally WILLIAM F. OGBURN, SOCIAL CHANGE (1923). Sociologist William F.
Ogburn defined cultural lag as what happens when culture that regulates society does not
keep up with social change. Id.
134. See PC Magazine, PC Magazine Celebrates The Fifteenth Anniversary of the PC:
Special Issue Covers Fifteen Dynamic Years of the Computing, PCs of the Future and Conversations with The Founders of Microsoft and Intel, PR NEwSwIE, Mar. 6, 1997.
135. See Carolyn Van Brussel, Mobile PCs: '90s Their Decade, Speaker Claims, 18 CoMPUTING CANADA 14 (June 22, 1992).
136. Id. (noting that by 1992 software services was expanding at a rate of two to three
times that of hardware).
137. Id.
138. James Aley, Give It Away and Get Rich! Plus Other Secrets of the Software Economy, FoRTuNE, June 10, 1996, at 90.
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intangibles and goods which are treated differently under the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.)." 1 39 With the enactment of UCITA, courts
will no longer need to classify intangibles as if they were the same as
tangible goods. The test for whether or not transactions are included in
or excluded from Article 2 is "whether their predominant factor, their
40
thrust, their purpose, reasonably stated... is a transaction of sale."'
Once the predominant purpose is established as an Article 2 sale of
14 1
goods, the UCC applies to the entire transaction.
The ABA Report argued that bad software cases were increasingly
litigated as tort cases rather than as contract disputes partially because
of the uncertainty of which rules should apply to computer contracts.
For example, an intentional misrepresentation provided the basis for liability under the computer contract case of VMark Software v. EMC
Corp.142 Computer litigation was the source of an "abnormally large
number of reported opinions dealing with software under state laws of
43
misrepresentation."1
Punitive damages are increasingly awarded in computer contract
disputes that involve independent torts or a "willful or knowing violation
of a state unfair and deceptive trade practices act." 144 In Chatlos Systems v. National Cash Register Corp. ("NCR"), a telecommunications
equipment manufacturer purchased a computer system from NCR. 1 45
The system was supposed to perform a number of bookkeeping and accounting functions, and NCR's sales agreement excluded liability for consequential damages and limited the manufacturer's liability to fixing
errors or defects within sixty days. 146 However, when the system was
still not working properly one and a half years later, the Third Circuit
found that NCR's limited repair remedy "failed of its essential purpose"
and awarded damages. 14 7 While it did not award consequential or punitive damages in this case, the court provided a concise definition illustrating when both can be awarded despite express liability limitation
139. NMP Corp. v. Parametric Tech. Corp., 958 F. Supp. 1536, 1542 (D. Okla. 1997).
140. Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that a contract for
sale of goods including substantial amounts of labor is covered by Article 2).
141. See Colonial Life Ins. Co. v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 817 F. Supp. 235,
238-39 (D.N.H. 1993).
142. VMark Software, Inc. v. EMC Corp., 642 N.E.2d 587, 594 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994)
(finding intentional misrepresentation as a predicate for Chapter 93A liability).
143. Id.
144. MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 93A § 11 (proving for up to three but not less than two times
actual damages for willful or knowing violations of the act). Double or treble damages are
awarded for "willful or knowing" violations of section 2 of Chapter 93A. Id.
145. Chatlos Systems, Inc. v. NCR Corp., 635 F.2d 1081, 1084 (3d Cir. 1980).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1088.
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14 8
clauses in a contract.
An empirical study completed by the ABA uncovered more than one
hundred computer contract decisions were reported in a period of just
two-years. 14 9 The ABA Report contended that the uncertain rules for
software contracts "encouraged the use of non-contract [tort] theories of
recovery."' 5 0 Tort remedies are rapidly replacing contract remedies because the legal infrastructure for software contracts is so "unclear and
unsettled."' 5 ' The ABA Report noted that there was "an ongoing uncertainty about ... the basic characteristics of a software contract."' 5 2 The
1 53
thrust was that computer contract law is "drowning in a sea of torts."
The committee concluded that the "development of the law relating to
software contracts can be significantly advanced through uniform
154
legislation."
UCITA's uniform contracting rules will bring greater certainty to
the law governing all information licenses, including software contracts,
online contracts and Internet contracts.' 5 5 UCITA is based upon a
software-licensing paradigm rather than on patent, copyright or trademark licensing models, and it employs an Article 2 template in its concepts and methods. 156 Article 2 has been the most successful codification
project in Anglo-American jurisprudence and is a familiar template for
the business community. However, Article 2 needs the tailoring of
UCITA to fit computer transactions.
Today, software is often distributed by remote access or Internet
download. Article 2 applies to "transactions in goods." 15 7 For example,
it requires a writing for the sale of goods costing $500 or more.' 5 8
UCITA addresses one problem with digital transactions by substituting
the concept of a "record" for a "pen and paper" signature. A record
"means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is
stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable
form."' 5 9 Therefore, UCITA validates computer-to-computer transac-

148. Id.
149. See Nimmer, ABA Proposal, supra note 125.
150. Id.

151. Id.
152. Id. at 5.
153. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CoNTRAcT 87 (1994) (coining the expression).
154. Nimmer, ABA Proposal, supra note 125.
155. See U.C.I.T.A. § 103.
156. See generally U.C.I.T.A. §§ 101-905 and U.C.C. §§ 2-101-725. The parts of
U.C.I.T.A. roughly track Article 2. (1) Definitions, General Scope and Terms; (2) Formation
and Terms; (3) Warranties; (4) Construction; (5) Transfer of rights and interests; (6) Performance; (7) Breach of Contract; (8) Remedies; and (9) Miscellaneous Provisions. Id.
157. U.C.C. § 2-102.
158. U.C.C. § 2-201(1).
159. U.C.I.T.A. § 102(a)(58).
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tions by substituting this concept of an electronic record as the functional
0
equivalent of writing.16
UCITA more closely fits the commercial realities of software licensing than does Article 2 of the UCC. A favorite question that Chief Justice Burger posed to counsel appearing before the Court was, "If it
doesn't make good sense, how can it make good law?" 16 1 How can it be
good law to apply a fifty-year-old law designed for durable goods to
software licensing and other computer contracts?
The durable sales legal paradigm is not even close to being a good fit
with the commercial realities of software licensing. Since software can
be downloaded from the Internet, no tangible goods are involved at all.
Judges must treat software "as if' intangible digital information is the
equivalent of durable goods because they have no specialized commercial
law for licenses. The adoption of UCITA develops default terms for information transfers bringing settled expectations to the Internet and beyond. Successful companies in the next century will use digital
information to redefine boundaries, 162 but today there is no centralized
body of contract law governing Internet commercial transactions.
2.

Legal Infrastructurefor E-Commerce

A new legal paradigm is necessary to facilitate e-commerce, which
may soon eclipse brick-and-mortar commerce. UCITA recognizes that
paper-based signatures are rapidly giving way to digital signature in ecommerce. 1 63 Just as with UCC Articles 2 and 2A, a UCITA agreement
may be formed even if one or more terms are left open, or are to be
agreed upon later. 16 4 UCITA permits contracts to be formed by electronic agents 165 with or without human review. 166 Electronic events, for
160. See U.C.I.T.A. § 107(a). Section 107(d) binds a person who uses electronic agents,
"even if no individual was aware of or reviewed the agent's operations or the results of the
operation." Id.
161. GERHART, supra note 32, at 557 (quoting Julius Duschla, Chief Justice BurgerAsks:
"If It Doesn't Make Good Sense, How Can it Make Good Law?" N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 5,
1969 at 140).
162. See generally BILL GATES, FROM BusINESS @ THE SPEED OF THOUGHT: USING A DIGITAL NERVOUS SYSTEM (1999).

163. A digital signature is an electronic identifier, created by encryption technology, intended by the party to have the same effect as a paper-based signature. Two dozen states
have passed some form of "digital signature laws" in the past two years. A number of
international organizations such as UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT favor the validation of
digital signatures.
164. See U.C.I.T.A. § 202. Section 202(a) states: "A contract may be formed in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including offer and acceptance or conduct of both parties
or operations of electronic agents which recognize the existence of a contract." Id.
165. See U.C.I.T.A. § 102(a)(28). An electronic agent "means a computer program, or
electronic or other automated means used independently to initiate an action or respond to
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example, may be "attributed to a person if it was the act of that person or
its electronic agent."16 7 Trading partner agreements form rules in advance for protocols for the ordering of goods and payment through electronic messages. UCITA develops a default for when an electronic
message is triggered: "An electronic message is effective when received,
16 8
even if no individual is aware of its receipt."
Electronic access contracts are a growing part of the information
economy. America Online, for example, has millions of subscribers who
obtain remote access to hundreds of thousands of databases. 169 UCITA
provides the legal infrastructure for "access contracts" in which the user
obtains electronic "[a]ccess to, or information from, an information
170
processing system of another person or the equivalent of such access."
UCITA provides for contract formation, warranties, and remedies to accommodate a wide array of online contracts.
The commercial law needs to be modernized to validate a whole
17 1
range of useful contracting forms that fuel the information economy.
UCITA defines the "electronic agent" as a "computer program or electronic or other automated means used independently to initiate an action
or respond to electronic messages or performances without review or action by an individual at the time of the action, response, or
17 2
performance."
Electronic agency is a critical concept in e-business where orders
and acknowledgment forms are processed without human review. Offer
and acceptance may be made entirely by "the interaction of electronic
agents." 173 The concept of manifestation of assent has been extended to
electronic date interchange where records are authenticated without
human review following rules established by trading partner agreements. 174 UCITA only adapts the common law concept of the reasonable
person to the "reasonably configured electronic agent."175 An electronic
agent may have an "opportunity to review a record or term only if the
electronic messages or performances without review or action by an individual at the time
of the action, response or performance." Id.
166. See U.C.I.T.A. § 112.
167. U.C.I.T.A. § 214(a).
168. U.C.I.T.A. § 217(a).
169. See, e.g., Houston Chronicle, AOL Hits Mark of 10 Million Subscribers(visited Apr.
25, 1999) <http'//wwwl.chron.com/cgi-bin/auth/story/content/chronicle/business/97/11/18/
brf-aol.biz-O.html>.
170. U.C.I.T.A. § 102(a)(1).
171. See WHrrE HOUSE, supra note 60 (contending that the Global Information Infrastructure requires new rules for electronic commerce).
172. U.C.I.T.A. § 102(a)(28).
173. U.C.I.T.A. § 206(a).
174. See U.C.I.T.A. § 112(b).
175. U.C.I.T.A. § 102(a)(15).
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record or term is made available in manner that would enable a reasonably configured electronic agent to react to the record or term."176 "An
electronic event is attributed to a person if it was the act of that person
or its electronic agent, or the person is otherwise bound by it under the
law of agency or other law." 177 Attribution procedures are defined as a
means of verifying "that an electronic event is that of a specific person or
to detect changes or errors in the information." 1 78 A court must assess
the "efficacy and commercial reasonableness of an attribution
1 79
procedure."
UCITA incorporates a concept of authentication that validates digital signatures that are already in widespread use. The attributes of a
digital signature are unique identifiers to the user which are capable of
verification and under the control of the user. Digital signatures use algorithms, which are "encrypted and decrypted using public and private
keys." 180 Digital signatures use methods such as public key cryptography to bring security and authenticity to online transactions. 81' An attribution procedure may be used to detect changes or errors in
information. UCITA is a minimalist statute that does not favor one attribution procedure over another. This flexible approach allows UCITA to
keep in step with changing attribution procedures. UCITA notes that
attribution procedures may use "algorithms or other codes, identifying
words or numbers, encryption, callback or other acknowledgments, or
82
other procedures reasonable under the circumstances."'
UCITA defines authentication to mean "to sign, or otherwise to execute or adopt an electronic symbol, sound, or process attached to, included in, or logically associated or linked with a record or term, with the
intent to sign the record or a record to which it refers." 8 3 UCITA's concept of an authenticated record updates the concept of a signature to include digital signatures, encrypted signatures and other recent
inventions.' 8 4 UCITA's approach is liberal and standards-based, consistent with its UCC heritage. Authentication "may be proven in any manher," 18 5 and if the parties comply with a "commercially reasonable
attribution procedure for authenticating a record, the record is authenti176. U.C.I.T.A. § 112(e)(2).
177. U.C.I.T.A. § 214(a).

178. U.C.I.T.A § 102(a)(5).
179. U.C.I.T-A. § 213.
180. Center for Social and Legal Research, Security Tutorial,Digital Signatures (visited
July 2, 1999) <http://www.privacyexchange.org/tsi/digitalsig.htm>.

181. Id.
182. U.C.I.T.A. § 102(a)(5).
183. U.C.I.TA. § 102(a)(6).
184. See U.C.C. § 2B-102, Reporter's Note 2 (Tentative Draft, Apr. 15, 1998).
185. U.C.I.T.A. § 108(a).
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cated as a matter of law."186
UCITA provides legal rules for Web-site linking agreements, affiliate agreements, legal notices, license agreements, access contracts, clickwrap agreements, end-user agreements, click-wrap agreements, online
shopping, auction bidding agreements, terms of services agreements,
and online licenses of all kinds. Section 102 defines attribution procedures, authentication, computer information, electronic agents, electronic events, electronic messages, and other terms critical to ecommerce.187

UCITA is a "cyberspace commercial statute" for licensing in the digital information economy.' 8 8 Computers can already instantly convert
text-to-speech, recognize speech itself, and configure neural networks. 18 9
In two decades, it may be possible to reverse-engineer the human brain
and produce a virtual tactile environment. 190 UCITA is a modern statute
that will facilitate computer information transactions such as these in
the next millennium.
3. The Exportability of UCITA
A growing number of companies are distributing mass-market
software on their Web sites. The Internet, by its very nature, is international, yet there is no uniform legal infrastructure for the distribution of
software in the global marketplace. In the absence of international conventions, domestic law applies to license agreements. There is great uncertainty as to whose law will govern online commerce, which knows no
international borders. Uniform rules for safeguarding commercial information transfers would be a desirable international development. The
basic framework of UCITA comports well both with emergent information technologies and with radically different social, economic and legal
systems. 191

The movement to devise uniform rules to be used in private international law has evolved rapidly over the past century. 19 2 For example, the
United National Commission for International Trade ("UNCITRAL"),
the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
("UNIDROIT"), the Council on Europe ("Council") and the International
186. U.C.I.T.A. § 108(b).
187. See U.C.I.T.A. § 102.

188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See Raymond T. Nimmer, Licensing on the Global Information Infrastructure:Disharmony in Cyberspace, 16 Nw. J. INr'L L. & Bus. 224 at 238 (1995) (arguing that the

global information infrastructure requires a uniform licensing law).
192. See Anthony D'Amato & Doris Estelle Long, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
ERTY ANTHoLoGY 3 (Anthony D'Amato & Doris Estelle Long eds., 1996).
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Chamber of Commerce (ICC) have all spearheaded past efforts to create
international commercial law. UNCITRAL's Model Law on Electronic
Commerce is consistent with UCITA's e-commerce infrastructure. The
Model Law, like UCITA validates the digital signature as the functional
equivalent of the "pen and paper" signature. Article 7 of UNCITRAL's
model law on Electronic Commerce defines a signature as follows:
(1)Where the law requires the signature of a person, that requirement
is met in relation to a data message if: (a) a method is used to identify
that person and to indicate that person's approval of the information
contained in the data message; and (b) that method is as reliable as was
appropriate for the purpose for which the data message was generated
or communicated, in 93
the light of all the circumstances, including any
relevant agreement. 1
UCITA is also in harmony with the Convention of Contracts for International Sale of Goods ("CISG") drafted by UNCITRAL. UCITA's
adoption of the Statute of Frauds is, however, inconsistent with international practice. The Statute of Frauds is an archaic formalism that has
long been abolished in England. 194 UCITA's reporter retained the Statute of Frauds for contracts requiring payment of $5,000 or greater 195 as
a compromise to industry and consumer groups. The United States
stands alone in world legal systems requiring the parties to a contract to
memorialize their agreement in writing.
UCITA treats a "record" as the functional equivalent of a signed
writing, updating the Statute of Frauds for Internet transactions.1 96 A
"record" means "information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or
that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form." 197 CISG does not explicitly address software licensing.
It is designed for the sale of goods and only applies to the licensing of
information by analogy as with Article 2. In fact, CISG excludes "contracts in which the preponderant part of the obligations ...

consists in

the supply of labour or other services." 19 8 CISG sought "to isolate from
the body of commercial law, a special subset, the international sale, and
create a unified set of rules for the group of transactions." 1 99 Many CISG
concepts and methods are in harmony with UCITA's rules for licensing
software.
193. UNCITRAL Model Law On Electronic Commerce, Article 7.
194. See James J. White & Robert S. Summers, U.C.C. 64 (5th ed. 1999).

195.
196.
197.
198.
Official

See U.C.I.T.A. § 201.
Id. § 201(a)(1).
Id. at § 102(a)(58).
Final Act of the U.N. Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
Records, Annex I at 230 (Apr. 10, 1980), U.N. Doc. A/ Conf.9 7/18, reprinted in 19
IN'L LEGAL MATERLALS 668 (1980), art. 3(2) [hereinafter CISGI.
199. Arthur Rosett, CriticalReflections on the United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the InternationalSale of Goods, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 265, 268 (1987).
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Concept of Material Breach

UCITA provides that an "aggrieved party may refuse a performance
that is a material breach as to that performance ...
*"200 Therefore,
UCITA adopts a substantial performance or material breach standard
versus Article 2's parochial and unrealistic perfect tender rule for performance, which is followed by no other country. 2 0 1 Article 25 of CISG
sets the standard of performance as "fundamental breach,"20 2 a concept
closely akin to UCITA's material breach. A material breach is "a substantial failure to perform an agreed term that is an essential element of
the agreement." 20 3 A substantial breach is one "that deprives the aggrieved party of a significant benefit it reasonably expected under the
contract." 20 4 In contrast, the UCC Article 2 perfect tender rule permits a
buyer to obtain substitute goods if the goods fail "in any respect to conform to the contract." 20 5 Perfect tender is not a realistic performance
standard for the sale of goods, and courts find ways to bypass this harsh
doctrine. Perfect tender is a disaster for the software industry where
software may be composed of millions of lines of code. A licensee should
not be able to cancel a software contract because of a minor bug or errant
line of code. The material breach standard parallels the fundamental
breach of CISG. 20 6 Finally, UCITA's material breach standard parallels
UNIDROIT principles for performance that is reasonable and deter20 7
mined from the terms of the contract.
Under a fundamental breach standard, there is a question of what
level of performance deficit in the software would warranty rejection.
The vast majority of fundamental breach cases will be ones in which the
software fails to substantially conform to its documentation. A survey of
software cases regarding bad software reveals that the most common
problems were errors or failures in the form of reports, processing
200. U.C.I.T.A. § 601(b)(1).
201. See U.C.I.T.A. § 601(b).
202. CISG, art. 25.
203. U.C.I.T.A. § 701 (b)(2).
204. U.C.I.T.A. § 701(b)(3)(B).
205. U.C.C. § 2-601.
206. See CISG, art. 25. Under CISG, "breach of contract" covers all failures of a party to
perform any of his obligations. However, a fundamental breach is more serious and may
warrant cancellation:
A breach of contract committed by one of the parties is fundamental if it results in
such detriment to the other party as substantially to deprive him of what he is
entitled to expect under the contract, unless the party in breach did not foresee
and a reasonable person of the same kind in the same circumstances would not
have foreseen such a result.
Id.
207. See U.C.C. § 2B-601, Reporter's Note (Draft, Dec. 1, 1995) (citing UNIDROIT, Principles Of International Commercial Contracts, Art. 5.6 Revised, as Uniform Law Source for
this section).
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speeds, amount of data that could be handled, and number of multiple
users or peripherals that could be connected within a system. 208 The
case law reflects that fundamental breach in cases regarding bad
software centers on the failure of acceptance testing,20 9 deviation from
functional specifications, 2 10 late delivery computer software and products, 2 1 1 the failure of compatibility, 2 12 the amount of data that can be
handled, and processing speed. 2 13 The licensee of bad software should
have the power to cancel the contract or license where there is a material
breach, rather than having to rely on the perfect tender rule of Article
2.214

b.

Digital Signatures

UCITA's e-commerce legal infrastructure is consistent with work being done by international organizations such UNCITRAL and
UNIDROIT. The goal of these initiatives is to validate binding international standards for electronic or digital signatures. UNCITRAL's Model
Law on Electronic Commerce 2 15 and the ABA's Science and Technology
Committee have developed digital signature guidelines that are harmo208. See Cynthia Anthony & Michael Rustad, Breach and Adaptation of Computer
Software Contracts: A Report to the ABA Software Licensing Subcommittee (June 15,
1993) (surveying industries which produced software for mass-market design applications;
student loans; accounting activities; health care insurance claims; and telecommunications

services).
209. See, e.g., Whittaker Corp. v. Calspan Corp., 810 F. Supp. 457 (W.D.N.Y. 1992)
(finding that "the actual variances from the contract specifications raises a material question of fact as to the value of the delivered system.").
210. See e.g., Photo Copy, Inc. v. Software, Inc., 510 So.2d 1337 (La. Ct. App. 1987)
(holding that rejection of a computer system was warranted because the software program
could not perform a key cross reference function and observing that the disappointed
buyer's "principal motive or cause" in busying the system was to obtain a cross referencing
function).
211. See, e.g., Cash Management Services, Inc. v. Banctec, Inc., U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10768
(D. Mass. Sept. 21, 1988) (finding that the late delivery of equipment prevented the vendee
from conducting proper acceptance testing; failing to make prompt delivery within a reasonable time or within the time specified, the contract may be deemed to be fundamentally
breached).
212. See, e.g., Foundation Software v. Digital Equipment Corp., 807 F. Supp. 1195 (D.
Md. 1992) (holding that the vendor failed to meet its warranty of promising that software
would run on the Micro Vax).
213. See e.g., Midland Management Corp. v. Computer Consoles, Inc., U.S. Dist. LEXIS
537 (No. 87 C 971, N.D. Ill., E.D. Jan. 21, 1992) (finding that the computer system could not
support more than sixteen concurrent users and that the thirty two user capability warranty did not exist).
214. The performance standard for single delivery sales contract is perfect tender. See
U.C.C. § 2-601.
215. See United Nations, Uncitral Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide to
Enactment (visited May 4, 2000) <httpJ/www.unictral.org/english/texts/electcom/ml-ec.
htm>.
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nized with UCITA's e-commerce concepts of attribution and
authentication.
The International Chamber of Commerce proposes a broad self-regulatory program governing electronic commerce, including guidelines for
2 16
Trustsecure and trustworthy digital transactions over the Internet.
worthy e-commerce depends upon attribution procedures that verify the
integrity of transactions and the authenticity of electronic messages. An
attribution procedure may also be used to detect changes or errors in
information. As stated earlier, UCITA notes that attribution procedures
may use "algorithms or other codes, identifying words or numbers, encryption, callback or other acknowledgments, or other procedures rea2 17
sonable under the circumstances."
Since some form of authentication is critical to the success of e-commerce, binding international standards must be developed for electronic
or digital signatures. Towards that end, UNCITRAL is preparing uniform rules for electronic signatures and certificate authorities, 2 18 and
UCITA is legitimizing computer-to-computer contracts by substituting
the concept of an electronic "record" for the writing requirement that
grew out of paper-based transactions.
Increasingly, digital signatures are having the same force and effect
as a manual signature. UCITA's concept of authentication is the electronic equivalent of a paper-based signature. 2 19 UCITA defines the term
"to authenticate" to mean "to sign or otherwise execute or adopt a symbol
-"220
or to use encryption or another process with respect to a record ..
UCITA's attribution rules provide a legal template consistent with recent developments in international private law.
c.

Choice of Law and the Internet

The Internet challenges choice of law principles because it is "not a
physical or tangible entity, but rather a giant network which interconnects innumerable smaller groups of computers." 2 2 1 One of the vexing
questions in this area is choosing which law should apply to multi-state
or multi-national contracts in an increasingly global economy.
A European Council Working Group was established to revise the
Brussels Convention governing the enforcement of judgments and the
Rome Convention on the treatment of contracts. Both Conventions
216. Id. at 85.
217. U.C.I.T.A. § 102(a)(5).
218. See United Nations, supra note 215, at 85.
219. See U.C.I.T.A. § 102. U.C.I.T.A. updates the concept of signature to include digital
signatures, encrypted signatures and other authenticated methods yet to be developed. Id.
Online contracts may be formed simply by the exchange of electronic records. Id.
220. Id. at § 102(a)(6)(A)--(B).
221. CompuServe v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1018 (S.D. Ohio, 1997).
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adopt the "country of origin" doctrine, 22 2 and they recognize a consumer
transactions exception "that under narrow circumstances, a consumer
should be allowed to rely on the courts and the law of the country in
which the services are received." 22 3 The UCC permits the parties to
choose applicable law, provided that the transaction bears a "reasonable
2 24
relationship" to the chosen body of law.
Choice of forum agreements may be found in a variety of online contracts, including license agreements, trading partner agreements or Web
site development agreements. The UCITA reporter notes that by 1999
there were over 100 decisions on Internet personal jurisdiction:
The decisions reveal an uncertainty about when doing business on the
Internet exposes a party to jurisdiction in all States and all countries.
The uncertainty affects both large and small enterprises, but has
greater impact on small enterprises that are and will continue to be the
lifeblood of electronic commerce. Choice of forum terms allow parties to
control this issue and the risk or costs it creates. This section allows the
agreement to govern, but
adds restrictions based on fundamental public
2 25
policy considerations.
Under UCITA, the parties to a license agreement have the discretion
to choose an exclusive judicial forum unless it is "unjust." The license
agreement needs to expressly state that the forum is exclusive in order
for it to be enforceable, so a choice-of-forum term is not exclusive unless
the agreement so provides. 22 6 UCITA's choice-of-forum rules fairly balance the interests of the software industry with those of licensees.
UCITA, as it is presently drafted, will fulfill the statutory objective of
expanding business practices.
III.

TOWARD A CONSUMER-FRIENDLIER UCITA

The codification of industry "things as they are" must be balanced
with utopian regulatory rules and standards. UCITA is arguably far
more consumer-friendly than any of the Articles of the UCC. UCITA, for
example, does not preempt or invalidate state consumer protection statutes, 227 and its warranties and remedies are supplemented by federal
consumer statutes which provide prevailing plaintiffs with attorney's
fees and, in some cases, treble damages. 228 Furthermore, unlike Article
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
clauses
227.
228.

See United Nations, supra note 215, at 85.
Id.
U.C.C. § 1-105.
U.C.I.T.A., Preface of Reporter.
See Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (holding that choice of forum
were presumptively valid).
See U.C.I.T.A. §105.
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301.
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2, UCITA provides consumers with a right of refund if the terms of the
mass market license are not acceptable.
A.

GUARANTEED MINIMM

REMEDY FOR CONSUMERS

Shrink-wrap is the plastic or cellophane tightly wrapped around
packages, such as the wrapping on packages of meat in supermarkets
and cassettes and CD's in music shops. Increasingly, software licensors
market their retail software packages covered in shrink-wrap. One example of a shrink-wrap license is a license agreement on the outside of a
package covered in shrink-wrap that contains a diskette. These contracts are seldom, if ever, negotiated and marketed to the public under
the same terms for the same information. 22 9 UCITA makes shrinkwrap, click-wrap, and other mass-market license agreements broadly enforceable. A mass-market license is a standard form agreement where
the terms are offered to the general public on a "take it or leave it
23 0
basis."
1.

Mass-Market Licenses as Reverse UnilateralContracts

The mass-market license agreement generally begins with a legal
notice, disclaimer, or terms of use. The Web site agreement of Real Networks, for example, conditions access and use of its Web site on acceptance of its terms and conditions. 23 1 Professor Mark Lemley notes that
the purpose of such a clause is to create a "reverse unilateral contract."2 32 "Vendors intend that, by opening the plastic wrap and actually
using the software, customers will bind themselves to the terms of the
shrink-wrap license." 233 Adobe Systems license, for example, provides
that the customer's downloading of software from the site signifies agreement to its terms and conditions. 23 4 Real Network likewise intends that
Web site visitors will bind themselves to the Real Network's terms and
conditions, an example of the kind of agreement raising concerns about
its potential for abuse. 2 35 A pundit states, "by unwrapping a software
package or downloading a demo, you've agreed to a thickly worded con229. See U.C.I.T.A. § 102(a)(46)(b)(i).
230. U.C.I.T.A. § 102(a)(45)-(46).
231. See Real Networks, supra note 11.
232. Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrink-wrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1239, 1241 (1995).
233. Id.
234. See Adobe Systems, Inc., CustomerFirst Support (visited Feb. 1, 1999) <http'/
www.adobe.com/supportservice/custsupport>.
235. See Lemley, supra note 232. Professor Lemley notes a similar logic with respect to
shrink-wrap agreements: "Vendors intend that, by opening the plastic wrap and actually
using the software, customers will bind themselves to the terms of the shrink-wrap license." Id.
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tract that may result in enslaving your first-born child to Bill Gates for
236
all you know."
Due to these concerns, the enforceability of shrink-wrap and other
mass-market licenses is a deal breaker provision. Billions of dollars are
spent each year on shrink-wrap or click-wrap license transactions, yet
there is considerable uncertainty about the degree of enforceability of
such licensing arrangements. A 1995 survey of Computer Law Association attorneys found shrink-wrap issues to be one of the most frequently
mentioned subjects for reform. 2 37 Many computer lawyers in our sample
believed that shrink-wrap licenses should not be enforceable. 238 One
contended that "We should get rid of the idea that shrink-wraps are enforceable." 23 9 Another contended that "simple shrink-wrap licenses are
not legally effective. Shrink-wrap licenses are limited to the protection
afforded by copyright." 2 40 Yet another computer lawyer observed: "I believe the copyright laws should not be discarded based on an unsigned,
unbargained adhesion agreement." 24 1 One respondent stated:
I can't see any reason why this should apply to software and not everything else like books, tapes, stereo systems, etc. If that is the case, it is
restrictions on
bad precedent to allow a vendor to unilaterally24propose
2
the use of a product after it has been paid for.
Another lawyer felt that the single most important area for reform
was shrink-wrap and the unequal bargaining power of parties to these
transactions. 243 He viewed shrink-wrap agreements "as contracts of adhesion" which must be regulated. 244 While a majority of survey respondents (65%) generally favored the enforceability of shrink-wrap
licenses, 24 5 more than a third (35%) opposed the enforceability of massmarket licenses. 24 6 Even the supporters of the shrink-wrap acknowl24 7
edge the need to provide standard terms that protect end-users.

236. Margie Wylie, Shrink-Wrapping the Social Contract (Apr. 23, 1997) (visited Mar.
10, 1998) <http'/www.news.com/Perspectivesmw/mw423_97_a.html>.
237. See Michael Rustad, et al., An EmpiricalAnalysis of Software Licensing Law &
Practices (Part2), 10 COMPUTER L. ASS'N BULL. 3, 8 (1995).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See Rustad, supra note 237, at 8.
243. Id. at 9.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
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Mass-Market Licenses as Anti-Warranties

Mass-market licenses are so controversial because the software industry is unwilling to provide implied warranties of quality. One can
read hundreds of click-wrap, Web site, shrink-wrap, and other massmarket transactions and have yet to find a single example of a software
licensor willing to provide any warranty for its software, software products or services. The mass-market license agreement provides no warranties of any kind. Adobe Systems, for example, is typical in
disclaiming all warranties and damages:
DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES: YOU AGREE THAT ADOBE HAS
MADE NO EXPRESS WARRANTIES TO YOU REGARDING THE
SOFTWARE AND THAT THE SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED TO
YOU 'AS IS' WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, ADOBE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THE SOFTWARE,
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION,
ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
PURPOSE, MERCHANTABILITY, MERCHANTABLE
QUALITY OR
24
NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS. 8
The warranties offered in mass-market transactions are in effect
anti-warranties, which require the user to waive all rights to a remedy if
the software or computer contract fails. The licensor makes no express
or implied warranties with respect to the software, product or services.
Most consumers have no reasonable contractual expectations that,
by merely breaking open a shrink-wrap license or clicking agreement,
they are entering into a licensing agreement. Legal formalists object,
feeling that mass-market license agreements do not take the form of offer, acceptance and consideration, which is the staple of first year contract courses. Professor Slawson wrote in 1971 that "Itihe contracting
still imagined by courts and law teachers as typical, in which both parties participate in choosing the language of their entire agreement.. ." is
a legal fossil. 2 49 What does it mean to contract as we move to a new
millennium? The commercial reality is that many contracts in our postindustrial economy are adhesive contracts where all rights and remedies
25 0
are contracted away without even the possibility of negotiation.
Mass-market licenses are useful legal inventions, but they are not
contracts in their classical form. The legal formalists who oppose mass248. Adobe, supra note 234.
249. W. David Slawson, StandardForm Contracts and DemocraticControl of Lawmaking Power, 84 HAxv. L. REv. 529, 529 (1971).
250. The concept of the "contract of adhesion" was first formulated by Edwin Patterson.
See Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-InsurancePolicy, 33 HARV. L. Rsv. 198, 222
(1919). This concept of the adhesion contract was further developed by Friedrich Kessler.
See Friedrich Kessler, Contractsof Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,
43 COLuM. L. REv. 629 (1943).
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market licenses do not suggest an alternative contracting form that will
be cost-efficient. It is clear that mass-market licenses depart markedly
from traditional contract formation. These contracts do not present even
the possibility that the terms are negotiable. In many software contracts, the licensee does not even learn about the terms until after
payment.
Mass-market software or computer contracts are adhesive, but so is
almost every other contract. When was the last time a consumer bargained with an airline, an insurance company, a car rental company, and
the gas company? The take-it-or-leave-it nature of consumer contracts
was lampooned in the 1970s by Laugh In's Lily Tomlin: "We're the phone
company. We don't care; we don't have to." 25 1 Software vendors go even
further than the telephone company: they don't even bother to answer
the telephone, placing the customer on hold. 2 52 Ninety-nine percent of
all contracts are standard form contracts where there is no bargaining
over terms, and the consumer is offered the contract on a take-it-or253
leave-it basis.
UCITA broadly validates mass-market licenses so long as "the party
agrees to the license, such as by manifesting assent, before or during the
2 54
party's initial performance or use of or access to the information."
UCITA's view is that an adequate objective manifestation of assent consists of a mere opportunity to review the record coupled with an affirmative act such as clicking an icon or tearing open shrink-wrap plastic on
boxed software. "If a licensee does not have an opportunity to review a
mass-market license or a copy of it before becoming obligated to pay and
does not agree, such as by manifesting assent, to the license after having
that opportunity, the licensee is entitled to a return." 25 5 The alternative
to mass-market licensing would be to retain an attorney and negotiate
the terms, but negotiated mass-market license agreements are not costefficient.
Few topics engender more debate than the enforceability of shrinkwrap, click-wrap and Web-wrap license agreements. Take again the example of the shrink-wrap license agreement that appears on the outside
of the box containing a diskette or CD-ROM. Suppose the license agreement provides: "Opening the Envelope containing the diskette will constitute your agreement to the license which is contained on the outside of
251. Lily Tomlin as Ernestine, the Telephone Operator from Hell, Lily Tomlin Quotes
(visited Dec. 6, 1999) <http://members.aol.com/earthwest/mquotes.html>.
252. See CEM KANER & DAVID PELS, BAD SOFTWARE: WHAT TO DO WHEN SOFTWARE FAILs
28, 29 (1998) (citing Software Publishers Association Study that the average hold time for a

software service call is 12.2 minutes).
253. See Slawson, supra note 249 at 235.
254. U.C.I.T.A. § 210(a).
255. U.C.I.T.A. § 210(b).
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the envelope." Professor Mark Lemley's survey of the laws of twentyfour countries concludes that there is no clear consensus on the enforce2 56
Poliability of these shrink-wrap licenses in the global marketplace.
cies ranged widely, from treating them as presumptively unenforceable
to considering them enforceable. Lemley notes that "[a] number of countries either refuse to enforce shrink-wrap licenses at all or place restrictive conditions on the form and contents of such licenses. Relatively few
2 57
countries freely enforce shrink-wrap licenses."
If UCITA is to serve as an international template for licensing
software, should at least incorporate some additional consumer protections. Article 2 does not provide buyers a right to the return of the price
except under strictly limited circumstances. 25 8 The right to a refund, a
right not given by Article 2, would be a significant advance for consumers. Courts in many countries promote reasonableness and fairness in
contracting by legislating mandatory terms or through judicial intervention. 25 9 UCITA already tempers freedom of contract using the tools of
unconscionability, public policy limitations and "failure of essential
purpose."
Social welfarism in contract law has been particularly well developed in England and Scandinavia. 2 60 Mass-market licenses are adhesive
contracts and need to be policed for unfair terms. In many European
countries, welfarism in contract law has taken the form of mandatory
terms and police powers given to courts to adjust unfair contracts. 26 1 The
enforceability of online contracts is critical to the expansion of e-commerce. UCITA will not become a model for global Internet commercial
transfers of information if shrink-wrap or click-wrap licenses are not
widely enforced. As mentioned, the CISG governs sales of goods between buyers and sellers in different signatory nations. Unlike Article 2,
however, CISG does not govern consumer transactions. CISG is largely
consumer neutral and permits countries to determine their own basic
provisions with their own desired level of social welfare. UCITA, as presently drafted, while consumer neutral, does provide mass-market licensees with limited due process rights. If UCITA is to be a model for an
international convention for information transfers, it will need further
consumer protections.
256. See Lemley, supra note 232.
257. Id. at 1252-53.
258. See U.C.C. § 2-709.
259. See generally ROGER BROWNSWORD, WELFARISM IN CONTRACT LAw 1 (1993).

260. Id.
261. See, e.g., Thomas Wilhelmsson, The Philosophy of Welfarism and its Emergence in
the Modern Scandinavian Contract Law, in WELFARISM IN CONTRACT LAw 68 (Roger
Brownsword, et al. eds., 1994).
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MANDATING MINIMUM ADEQUATE REMEDIES FOR CONSUMERS

Parties to a computer contract may exclude or modify implied warranties so long as the warranty disclaimer is conspicuous and specific.
The original drafts of Article 2B, however, did not extend § 2-719(2) to
information contracts. The present draft of UCITA already adopts Article 2's concept of the "Failure of Stipulated Remedy to Achieve its Essential Purpose" in § 804. It follows the UCC's § 2-719(1) and provides that
parties to a contract may agree to limit the remedies available in the
event of a breach, but it states the limited remedy is optional "unless the
remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole
26 2
remedy."
Plaintiffs have successfully challenged limited or exclusive remedies
by showing they failed of their essential purpose in diverse factual settings. The New York Law Revision Commission noted that § 2-719(2) "is
not concerned with arrangements which were oppressive at their inception, but rather with the application of an agreement to novel circumstances not contemplated by the parties."2 63 For example, a ten-day
period to reject goods was struck down when the court in Wilson Trading
Corp. v. David Ferguson,Ltd. applied § 2-719(2).264 In Wilson, the seller
delivered yarn that "shaded" after it was woven into sweaters and laundered. 265 The seller provided a limited exclusive remedy that any defects in the yarn must be reported within 10 days. 26 6 The shading
problem, however, could not be discovered until the cloth was knitted
and washed. The court found that a contract that barred all claims of
defects in clothing was unconscionable because the remedy failed of its
essential purpose.2 67 The Wilson court reversed the summary judgment
on behalf of the defendant and remanded the case to determine whether
2 68
the shading defects were discoverable before knitting and processing.
The case law on "failure of essential purpose" reveals that this doctrine is used by courts to mitigate harsh or oppressive bargains. A repair
limitation failed of its essential purpose after one party unsuccessfully
262. U.C.C. § 2-719(1).
263. 1 N.Y. ST. L. RvisIoN COMMISSION 1955 REP. at 584 (1955).
264. See Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 244 N.E.2d 685 (N.Y. 1968).

265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. But see White & Summers, supra note 194, at 453. White and Summer argue
that the court misapplied 2-719(2) in the Wilson Trading case. Id. They argue that "the
exclusive remedy might have been unreasonable but did not fail of its essential purpose.
Id. The exclusive remedy should have been invalidated, if at all, under Code provisions
that deal with terms oppressive at inception." Id.
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2 69
Another
tried to repair an automobile seven times in nine months.
repair or replace parts limitation failed when the goods could not be repaired or parts replaced to make the goods free of defect. 2 70 In lemon
automobile cases, the doctrine is used to strike down an exclusive repair
remedy where the automobile can not be fixed after numerous attempts.
UCITA allows vendors to disclaim implied' warranties, limit their liability, and restrict licensee's remedies within the parameters of good
faith, commercial reasonableness and conscionability. It also permits
parties to set their own remedies and measure of damages, but this is a
legal fiction when the model is extended to mass-market transactions.
Therefore, there should be a minimum adequate remedy if the exclusive
remedy provided by the vendor is, in effect, no remedy at all. Professors
White and Summers state that "§ 2-719(2) raises two main questions,
which can be attributed to the two clauses that make up the provision.
When does an exclusive or limited remedy fail of its essential purpose?
When a remedy fails, what remedies are available to the buyer?" 27 '
Courts will not enforce a remedy for an adhesive software license that
"fails of its essential purpose," so where a court finds this failure, the
aggrieved consumer should have the full panoply of UCITA remedies at
their disposal.
Professors White and Summers observe that § 2-719(2) has been the
2 72
most powerful tool in the UCC arsenal for dissatisfied customers.
They argue that "it is hard to find any provision in Article 2 that has
been more successfully used by aggrieved buyers in the last [251 years
than Section 2-719(2)."273 The first official comment to § 2-719 states the
statutory purpose of the failure of essential purpose doctrine:
[It is of the very essence of a sales contract that at least minimum adequate remedies be available. If the parties intend to conclude a contract
for sale within this Article they must accept the legal consequence that
that there be at least a fair quantum of remedy for breach of the obligations or duties outlined in the contract .... 274

The most recent draft of UCITA extends this doctrine to computer
information transactions. 27 5 Section 803 provides that if an exclusive or
269. See King v. Taylor Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 184 Mich. App. 204, 457 N.W.2d 42
(1990).
270. See Great Dane Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Malvern Pulpwood, Inc., 301 Ark. 436, 785

S.W.2d 13 (1990).
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

White & Summers, supra note 194, at 449.
Id.
Id.
U.C.C. § 2-719.
See U.C.C. [NEw] REVISED ARTICLE 2 SALES § 2-719 at 107 (A.L.I., Reporter's In-

terim Draft, Nov. 1999). The Reporter provides no rationale for excluding the well-established doctrine of "failure of essential purpose" which has been adopted by Revised Article
2. Id. Section 2-719(b) of Revised Article 2 provides:
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limited remedy "fail[s] of its essential purpose, the aggrieved party may
pursue other remedies under [UCITA]."276 The commercial reality is
that mass-market license agreements are the classic embodiment of the
adhesive contract. Software customers are entitled to a non-disclaimable
minimum adequate remedy.
UCITA's adoption of Article 2's failure of essential purpose provision
moderates the harsh effects of the seller's attempts to disclaim warranties and consequential damages. Under Article 2, a disclaimer occurs
when a seller of goods uses language or conduct to negate or limit implied warranties, 2 77 and UCITA's methodology for disclaiming warranties parallels Article 2's provisions. Arguably, courts already have ample
tools under UCITA to police abuses of power in computer contracts. "A
court, in its discretion, may refuse to enforce the contract as a whole if it
is permeated by... unconscionability, or it may strike any single term or
group of terms" in an online contract or license agreement. 2 7s
1.

Manifesting Assent & Review of Terms

UCITA already provides mass-market licensees with some protection from unfair oppressive terms. For example, it provides licensees
with procedural protection when they enter into standard-form agreements. A party adopts the terms of a record, including a click-wrap or
shrink-wrap agreement, only if there is a manifestation of assent. Section 112 binds a party to the terms of a shrink-wrap or click-wrap agreement if the party had reason to know his acts would be treated as assent
to the terms. Mass-market licenses are adopted "only if the party agrees
to the license, such as by manifesting assent, before or during the party's
2 79
initial performance, or use have of or access to the information."
Quite simply, under UCITA, there is no manifestation of assent without
the party having an opportunity to review the terms prior to assent.
(b) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose in a contract other than a consumer contract, remedy may be had as
provided in this Act. However, an agreement expressly providing that consequential damages are excluded is enforceable to the extent permitted under subsection

(d).
Id. § 2-719.
276. U.C.I.T.A. § 803(b).
277. See U.C.C. § 2-316 (providing the methodology for disclaiming and limiting
warranties).
278. U.C.I.T.A. § 111(a). Defendants are given an opportunity to present evidence regarding the circumstances that existed at the time the license agreement or other online
contract was made: "If it is claimed or appears to the court that a contract or any term
thereof may be unconscionable, the parties must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to
present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose, and effect, to aid the court in mak-

ing the determination." Id.
279. U.C.I.T.A. § 210(a).
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Section 212 validates Internet-type transactions in which "computer
information [is made] available to a licensee electronically from its Internet or similar electronic site."28 0 A licensor must afford a Web site
visitor "an opportunity to review the terms of a standard form license...
before the information is delivered or the licensee becomes obligated to
pay, whichever comes first."28 l If the party has no "opportunity to review a mass-market license or a copy of it before becoming obligated to
pay and does not agree," he or she is entitled to a refund along with rea28 2
sonable expenses.
Section 212 provides that the terms of an Internet license must be
displayed "prominently and in close proximity to a description of the
computer information." 283 Another option is to disclose "the availability
of the standard terms in a prominent place on the site from which the
computer information is offered and promptly furnish a copy of the standard terms on request before the sale or license of the computer
284
information."
The licensor can create a "safe harbor," proving manifestation of assent with the built-in "double click," which requires the user to reaffirm
assent. For example, a consumer may be asked to accept or decline
terms with one click, and then be asked to confirm that they are certain
of their acceptance with a second click. A party adopts the terms of a
shrink-wrap or click-wrap license if the customer has an opportunity to
review the terms and manifested assent by some affirmative act.
Software licenses typically limit all damages and provide an exclusive
remedy. UCITA's contract formation rules provide consumers with limited procedural protections not guaranteed by present industry practices.
As with all other contracting forms, there is no duty to read mass-market
agreements. The consumer carelessly clicking through screens without
reading them does so at his or her peril, but UCITA provides courts with
the tools to strike down grossly unfair or misleading software or clickthrough licensing agreements.
2.

Policing Unconscionability

UCITA adopts Article 2's concept of unconscionability, which give
courts the power to strike down unconscionable contracts or terms, and
this doctrine applies to all UCITA license agreements. Section 111 of
UCITA gives courts the power to police contracts or any term. 28 5 A court
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

U.C.I.T.A. § 212.
U.C.I.T.A. § 212(1).
U.C.I.T.A. § 210(b).
U.C.I.T.A. § 212(1)(a).
U.C.I.T.A. § 212(1)(b).
See U.C.I.T.A. § 111.

586

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XVIII

may refuse to enforce the entire contract or the "remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or it may so limit the application
28 6
of any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result."
The issue of unconscionability is a matter of law and one for the trial
judge rather than the jury. 28 7 The basic test is whether the license
agreement or term should be invalidated because it is "so one-sided as to
be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the
making of the contract." 28 8 Unconscionability is an amorphous doctrine
2 89
designed to prevent "oppression and unfair surprise."
Arthur Neff distinguished between procedural unconscionability
where there is a lack of a meaningful choice due to unfair bargaining and
2 90
substantive unconscionability, which is the resultant unfair term.
The use of hidden terms is procedural unconscionability, whereas an exorbitant price constitutes substantive unconscionability. 29 1 In order to
strike down a license agreement or a clause in a license agreement, a
court must find both an unfair bargaining process, which is procedural
unconscionability, as well as unfair terms, which is substantive
unconscionability.
Procedural unconscionability means that the contract negotiation or
bargaining was unfair. Substantive unconscionability exists when the
terms of the resultant contract are unfair or abusive. One example of
procedural unconscionability is when one of the parties has no reasonable opportunity to know what he is signing. A door-to-door salesman,
for example, intentionally spills coffee on a prospective customer to divert his attention and then switches a promissory note for the sweepstakes entry form the consumer thought he was signing. This creates a
problem of procedural unconscionability. In contrast, substantive unconscionability is a finding that a license agreement has grossly one-sided
terms evaluated "in light of the general commercial background and the
292
commercial needs of the particular trade or case."
Subsection (b) of § 111 follows Article 2's methodology in requiring a
court to hear evidence of the commercial setting and other circumstances
before invalidating a license agreement on the grounds of unconscionability. 293 The UCITA reporter notes that "[tihe principle is one of the
286. U.C.I.T.A. § 111(a).
287. Id.
288. Maxwell v. Fidelity Financial Services, Inc., 184 Ariz. 82, 88, 907 P.2d 51, 57
(1995).
289. U.C.C. § 2-302, O.C. 1 (1995).
290. See Arthur Neff, Unconscionabilityand the Code-The Emperor'sNew Clause, 115
U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967).
291. See RUSTAD, supra note 89, at 277.
292. Id.
293. See U.C.I.T.A. § 111.
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prevention of oppression and unfair surprise and not of disturbance of
allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power."29 4 Unconscionability, however, has proved to be a toothless tiger when it comes to
computer contracts. There are few cases where a court has struck down
either a clause or an entire contract as unconscionable. UCITA already
provides non-consumer mass-market licensees with sufficient protection
against oppressive and unfair contracts. The extension of a minimum
adequate remedy for consumer transactions, therefore, will fairly balance freedom of contract with the need to regulate contracts where there
is no possibility of negotiation.
C.

1.

SUPPLEMENTAL CONSUMER PROTECTION

Extending Consumer Protection to Cyberspace

Incorporating statutory or common-law remedies for fraud or misrepresentation may also punish fraudulent practices by software vendors. UCITA follows the UCC practice of supplementing the statute with
principles of law and equity. UCITA's § 104 parallels UCC's § 1-103 in
permitting common law concepts to supplement the statute. The concept
of unconscionability, for example, is supplemented by the common law
doctrine of mistake. Increasingly, electronic agents are used in e-commerce, a practice validated by § 206 of UCITA. The "unconscionability
doctrine may invalidate a term caused by breakdowns in the automated
2 95
contracting processes."
A second reform would be to make it even more clear that state and
federal consumer statutes applicable to the sale of goods applies to the
licensing of software. 2 96 It would be beneficial to consumers to receive a
full federal warranty provision for software whether it is downloaded
from the Internet or sold in an office supply store. The software industry
would not be harmed if it were required to conspicuously disclose any
exclusions or limitations of consequential damages.
2. Extending Magnuson-Moss to Cyberspace
The Magnuson-Moss Act applies to consumer products costing more
294. U.C.I.T.A. § 111, Reporter's Note 2.
295. Id.
296. See, e.g., The Magnuson-Moss Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1997). Article 2 war-

ranties are supplemented and supplanted by federal consumer statutes such as the
Magnuson-Moss Act - Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act. Id. The MagnusonMoss Act is a federal law applying to all written warranties for consumer goods costing
more than $10. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1107 (1974). The Act requires all warranties made to
the consumer buyer to be labeled as either full or limited. See 15 U.S.C. § 2303(a). This
applies "to written warranties on tangible personal property which is normally used for
personal, family, or household purposes." See 16 C.F.R. § 700.1(a).
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than $10 that are "distributed in commerce."2 9 7 This federal consumer
protection statute was a response to the "developing awareness that the
paper with the filigree border bearing the bold caption Warranty' . . .
was often of no greater worth than the paper it was printed on." 2 9 8 However, it is unclear whether the Magnuson-Moss Act applies to computer
software transactions or information products.
The Magnuson-Moss Act bifurcates all warranties made to consumer
buyers as either full or limited. It does not cover merchant-to-merchant
sales, so it is chiefly a consumer protection statute. Under the
Magnuson-Moss Act, the implied warranty of merchantability is not disclaimable. 2 99 It provides that a supplier may not disclaim or modify any
implied warranty to a consumer if the supplier makes any written warranty to the consumer or if, at the time of the sale or within the next 90
days, the supplier enters into a service contract with the consumer regarding the product. 30 0 If only a limited warranty is given, any implied
warranty may be limited to the duration of the limited written warranty,
provided that its duration is conscionable, that it is set forth in clear and
unmistakable language, and that it is prominently displayed on the face
301
of the warranty.
If the Magnuson-Moss Act was extended to computer information
transactions, it would provide a remedy in cases involving "repeated failures to pass agreed upon acceptance tests," and cases where failure to
provide deliverables, such as source code, caused the licensee to withhold
payment. 30 2 There should be, in effect, a "lemon law" for computer
software, which permits attorney fees and costs to be recovered. Under a
lemon law, it would be presumed that a reasonable number of attempts
have been undertaken to conform a computer system to the licensor's
express warranty. If the Magnuson-Moss Act is extended to software
licenses, the implied warranty of merchantability would be non-disclaimable in consumer transactions.
3.

Extending State Deceptive Trade PracticesActs to UCITA

Most states have enacted deceptive trade practices acts sometimes
referred to as "little FTC acts."3 0 3 Section 2 of Massachusetts' Chapter
297. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(13).
298. H.R. REP. No. 93-1107 (1974).
299. Id. The implied warranty of merchantability is not disclaimable if goods are used
for personal, household, or family purposes.
300. See 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a)(1) - (2).
301. See 15 U.S.C. § 2308.
302. Whittaker Corp. v. Calspan Corp., 810 F. Supp. 457, 460 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
303. See, e.g., Ladas & Parry, United States - 'Little FTCs" Steal the Act (visited Apr.
25, 1999) <http://www.ladas.com/BULLETINS/1997/1297Bulletin/USLittleFTCs.html>;
Terry W. Schackmann & Clayton L. Barker, The FTC Act and the Franchise Disclosure
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93A makes it unlawful to engage in "unfair methods of competition and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices." 30 4 Case law defines unfair or deceptive acts as those that arise "to a level of rascality that would raise an
eyebrow of someone inured to the rough and tumble of the world of commerce." 30 5 A mass-market license with grossly unfair terms may be
found to be "unfair" or "deceptive."
Massachusetts' Chapter 93A provides double or treble damages and
attorneys fees for unfair and deceptive trade practices. 30 6 While there is
no case law on point, nothing in UCITA precludes an aggrieved consumer from filing a Chapter 93A claim for bad software. However,
UCITA's reporter notes that consumer protection regulations "may not
be consistent with an electronic contracting environment." 30 7 Section
104 of UCITA permits state and federal consumer legislation to supplement UCITA. However, if a reporter's note were added to make this explicit, UCITA would be more consumer-friendly and more likely to be
enforced in the global marketplace.
IV.

CONCLUSION

UCITA, like Article 2B, has been a product of the most open codification project in Anglo-American jurisprudence. "Electronic democracy
makes it possible for Internet users to participate in the codification process."30 8 Unlike many prior codification projects, many of the lawyers
participating in UCITA represent both licensors and licensees, precluding the possibility that "the law is driven solely by the licensor industry"
representatives. 30 9 UCITA is also unprecedented in its reporter's willingness to listen to diverse stakeholders and points of view. He has met
with and listened to the concerns of hundreds of industry groups, bar
associations and consumer groups. The fact that the UCITA drafting
process is open, however, does not satisfy some stakeholders. 3 10 UCITA
has been the subject of open debate, and the reporter has enacted compromises based upon his meetings with diverse interest groups.
Rule in Nieman v. Dryclean U.SA. Franchise Company, 18 FRANCHISE L.J. 108, 108 (Winter, 1999).
304. MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 93A, § 2; See also MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 11 (applying
statute to businesses).
305. Levings v. Forbes & Wallace, Inc., 8 Mass. App. Ct. 498, 496 N.E.2d 149, 153
(Mass. App. 1979).
306. See MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 93A, § 9(2).
307. Raymond T. Nimmer, Selling Products Online: Issues in Electronic Contracting,
467 PLI/PAT 823 (Jan. 1997).
308. Michael L. Rustad, Commercial Law Infrastructurefor the Age of Information, 16
J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 255, 313 (1997).

309. Dively & Cohn, supra note 60, at 319.
310. Id. at 313, n. 409.
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If a mandatory minimum adequate remedy is extended to computer
transactions, UCITA will fairly balance the interests of licensees and the
software industry. The explicit extension of state and federal consumer
protection to UCITA would make the proposed statute more attractive to
consumer groups and more enforceable in the world economy. Additionally, greater certainty in the rules for online contracts will benefit consumers in the long run by reduced transaction costs. Fortunately,
UCITA is flexible enough to accommodate transfers of information,
whether they occur across borders by remote access or through technologies yet to be conceived.
APPENDIX A: PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO UCITA § 406:
DISCLAIMER OR MODIFICATION OF WARRANTY.
(6) The implied warranty of merchantability is non-disclaimable in
consumer mass-market licenses or transactionsas defined in § 102(45) or
(46). If software or other information does not substantiallyconform to
the promises or affirmation of those made on the containeror label, computer screen or other documentation, a consumer is entitled to a fund plus
reasonable incidental expenses, but not consequential damages.
A consumer mass-market transaction is one where information is
used or bought for use primarily for personal, family, or household
purposes.
APPENDIX B: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO UCITA § 105.
SECTION 105: RELATION TO FEDERAL LAW; FUNDAMENTAL
PUBLIC POLICY; TRANSACTIONS SUBJECT TO OTHER
STATE LAW.
(a) A provision of this [Act] which is preempted by federal law is
unenforceable to the extent of the preemption.
(b) If a term of a contract violates a fundamental public policy, the
court may refuse to enforce the contract, may enforce the remainder of
the contract without the permissible term, or so limit the application of
the impermissible term as to avoid any result contrary to public policy, in
each case, to the extent that the interest in enforcement is clearly outweighed by a public policy against enforcement of the term.
(c) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), if this [Act] conflicts with a consumer protection statute[or administrativerule], the conflicting statute [or rule] governs.
For mass-market transactions,state and federal consumerprotection
that applies to the sale of consumer goods, applies equally well to massmarket licenses and transactionswith consumers. Mass-market licenses
and transactions must qualify as standard-form licenses as defined in
UCITA, § 102(45) and (46).

